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A Sociology of Constituent Power:




This article proceeds from a critical sociological revision of classical
constitutional theory. In particular, it argues for a sociological
reconstruction of the central concepts of constitutional theory: constituent
power and rights. These concepts, it is proposed, first evolved as an
internal reflexive dimension of the modern political system, which acted
originally to stabilize the political system as a relatively autonomous
aggregate of actors, adapted to the differentiated interfaces of a modern
society.
This revision of classical constitutional theory provides a basis for a
distinctive account of transnational constitutional pluralism or societal
constitutionalism. The article argues that the construction of
transnational normative orders needs to be placed, in a sociological
dimension, on a clearer continuum with classical constitutional models.
Although contemporary society is marked by multiple, nationally
overarching, and often functionally specific constitutions, such normative
structures extend the original functions of constituent power and rights.
The article sets out the concluding hypothesis that rights form a
running constitution in contemporary society, facilitating highly
improbable acts of transnational structural construction and systemic
inclusion. It is around the code rights-relevant/rights-irrelevant that
transnational society constructs its processes of politicization and
political inclusion. This code, however, brings to light a subsidiary or
skeletal coding, which was latently co-implied in the political exchanges
of modern society, and which was already expressed in early
constitutionalism.
* Until September 2013, Professor of Politics, University of Glasgow; from September
2013, Professor of Law, University of Manchester.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 20, Issue 2 (2013)
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, it has become clearly visible that certain
distinctive patterns of legal norm formation are developing, in which
inter- and transnational laws assume effective constitutional status
across former national/territorial boundaries, such that in many
respects national constitutions are displaced by, or at least in part
incorporated within, a transnational constitutional order.1 This
emerging constitutional order has been observed from many
standpoints. Analysis of the new constitutionality ranges, at one
extreme, from an (in itself varied) body of literature embracing the
global legal system as a Kantian world constitution based in obligatory
human rights to, at the other extreme, literature denying the presence
of anything but jurisdictional pluralism in the legal order of modern
society.2 Inquiry into these phenomena includes both literature fraught
1. Earlier versions of this article were presented twice in April 2012; first at a
seminar held at Universidad Adolfo Ibdfilez (Santiago de Chile), and then at the conference
'Transnational Societal Constitutionalism' hosted by International University College of
Turin (IUC) and Collegio Carlo Alberto (Turin). I wish to record my thanks to the
organizers of, and the participants in, both events. Particular gratitude is due to Fernando
Atria, Aldo Mascareflo, Poul Kjaer, Anna Beckers, and Gunther Teubner, whose questions
I have endeavoured to address, either directly or more obliquely, in preparing the final
text of this article. As it approached completion, this article also drew much benefit from
my discussions with Atina Krajewska.
2. In the former category see HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITAT: VON DER
BORGERFREUNDSCHAFr ZUR GLOBALEN RECHTSGENOSSENSCHAFT [SOLIDARITY: FROM
Civic FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY] (Ger.) (reconstructing the concept of
solidarity in terms of the "history of ideas" and analyzing its connection with the concept
of Democracy); Jirgen Habermas, Konstitutionalisierung des Volkerrechts und die
Legitimationsprobleme einer verfassten Weltgesellschaft [Constitutionalization of
International Law and the Problems of Legitimacy of a Constituted Global Society], in
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT [LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 21ST CENTURY] 369
(Winfried Brugger, Ulfrid Neumann & Stephan Kirste eds., 2008) (Ger.) (discussing the
idea of a political constitution for a world society and potential legitimacy requirements of
a democratically cosntituted world society that lacks a world government); OTFRIED
HOFFE, DEMOKRATIE IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG [DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION] (1999) (Ger.) (analyzing the term and the dynamics of globalization,
highlighting concrete and theoretical problems). On the rise of this perception, see Bardo
Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS 307, 309 (Nicholas
Tsagourias ed., 2007). Against these approaches, see Ming-Sung Kuo's claim that we are
witnessing the 'end of constitutionalism as we know it' in Ming-Sung Kuo, The End of
Constitutionalism as We Know It? Boundaries and the State of Global Constitutional
(Dis)ordering, 1 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 329 (2010). Additionally, see Nico Krisch's
assertion that in 'postnational governance' the 'classical forms' of constitutionalism are not
sustainable in NIco KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW 17 (2010). For summary of this controversy, see Oliver Diggelmann &
Tilmann Altwicker, Is there Something like a Constitution of International Law? A Critical
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with anxiety about the loss of sovereign territorial jurisdiction and
literature that identifies the homology of power and geographical
terrain as hopelessly outworn.3 Moreover, one increasingly influential
line in this field of analysis identifies transnational constitutional law
as arising specifically from legal exchanges situated beyond the
conventional constitutional sphere of public law and as not originally
reliant on acts of public-legal bodies: that is, it argues that
transnational law results from the hybridization of international public
and international private law in the normatively fluid and deeply
heterarchical processes of legal norm construction in global society.4
This article is not the place to reconstruct all the divergent threads
of such debates. However, what appears between the lines of all these
bodies of literature is the sense that the constitutional form of
contemporary society reflects a demise of (what are perceived to be) the
classical principles of constitutionalism. That is, it is commonly
suggested that this constitutional form reflects the diminishing
importance of the constitution as one written document or set of
documents that, originally underpinned by the popular will, prescribe a
hierarchy of legal norms and strictly allocate powers within a national
Analysis of the Debate of World Constitutionalism, 68 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 623 (2008).
3. In the former category, see JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAw WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 70 (2007); Ernest A. Young,
The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L. J. 527, 536, 542 (2003). In the
latter category, see ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER,
REGIME-KOLLISIONEN. ZUR FRAGMENTIERUNG DES GLOBALEN RECHTS [COLLISION OF
REGIMES. ON THE FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL LAW] 24 (2006) (Ger.); MARITI
KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2011); Paul Schiff Berman, A
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE L.J. 301, 314 (2007); Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1231 (2007); and Martti
Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties,
15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553, 555 (2002).
4. This approach was initiated by Gunther Teubner, and it has since been extended
by others, notably by Peer Zumbansen. Despite my great respect for this line of research, I
wish to be clear that my definition of the transnational constitution deviates from that
promoted in this literature. I am of the view that a transnational legal order that can
reliably be categorized as a constitution is still situated primarily in the realm of public
law, albeit not necessarily national public law. At a transnational level, this constitution is
primarily created through the interaction between judicial actors. For my longer
discussion of, and debate with, this literature see Chris Thornhill, National Sovereignty
and the Constitution of Transnational Law: A Sociological Approach to a Classical
Antinomy, 3 TRANSNAT'L LEG. THEORY 394-414 (2012). Specifically, I understand
transnational constitutional law as a body of legal norms, primarily produced by courts,
that evolves between the national and the international levels. Such law is situated
outside national societies, but it is not willed by sovereign state actors and it is not
reducible to international law, and it moves between national and supranational domains
through complex and uncertain processes of filtration.
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state, which itself exercises fixed public control of a particular societal
domain, and possesses monopolistic (although normatively curtailed)
authority for the production of laws in this territory.5 Above all,
different bodies of literature treating the transformation of
constitutional law are unified by the fact that they intuit a decline in
the force of sovereign constituent power and democratic legislative
power more generally as a determinant of modern transnational
constitutionalism. 6 All lines of analysis, whatever their disposition
towards the global constitution, concur in claiming that the existence of
a pre-legal constituent will has been lost in modern society, and
normative expectations derived from an arena outsides national society
now place prior constraints on all legal acts. In contemporary society,
thus, transnationally acceded norms (usually shaped by rights)
determine the prior form of national laws, and law can no longer be
traced to a founding point of regress. 7 The origin of binding law is now
in fact commonly law itself, and law (even primary, constitutional law)
is habitually derived from other laws: law is typically derived from laws
established through international charters, conventions, treaties, and,
above all, courts with authority to enforce international agreements
regarding rights.8 Because of this, it is commonly argued that the
5. For a relatively recent version of this theory see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF
PUBLIC LAW, 43-44 (2003). For the most committed, pluralistic repudiation of this
hierarchical, mono-focal theory of constitutional order see Peer Zumbansen, Comparative,
Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational
Legal-Pluralist Order, GLOB. CON. 48 (2012).
6. Parliaments have recently been described as "outmoded nineteenth-century
institutions," of necessity bound to cede ground to constitutional courts. This view was
expressed in 2002 by the then President of the Spanish Constitutional Court. This opinion
is quoted here from Said Amir Arjomand, Law, Political Reconstruction and Constitutional
Politics, 18 INTER'L SOCIOLOGY 27 (2003). Elsewhere, it is observed that legislative
sovereignty has simply 'disappeared' in recent years. See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions
and Judicial Power in COMPARATIVE POLITICS 218 (Daniele Caramani, ed, 2008).
7. See the deviation from the classical doctrine of constituent power as pre-legal force
as developed in RAYMOND CARR9 DE MALBERG, 2 CONTRIBUTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE
DE L'ETAT [CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE STATE] 490-91 (1920-22). For
a more recent neo-classical version on this theory, see ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE,
STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE. STUDIEN ZUR VERFASSUNGSTHEORIE UND ZUM
VERFASSUNGSRECHT [STATE, CONSTITUTION, STUDIES ON THEORIES OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 90-91 (2nd ed., 1991) (Ger.). On the absence of such power
under present societal conditions, see the account in Neil Walker, The Idea of
Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 340 (2002).
8. See Rainer Nickel, Legal Patterns of Global Governance: Participatory
Transnational Governance, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 158 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
eds., 2011) (providing that "it is widely acknowledged and well documented that
supranational and international entities or arrangements play an increasing role in the
shaping of national law"); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic
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classical constitutional antinomy between constituent and constituted
power has been effaced: now all power, even the power to found new
constitutions, is legally pre-constituted, and textbook examples of
constituted power (in particular, judicial actors) routinely construct
constitutional norms and so exercise de facto constituent power across
national divides.9 As a consequence of this, norms applied by constituted
judicial actors (especially in respect to rights) become recurrent
depositories of constituent power, and they act as preconditions for
constitution-making in multiple societal settings.1o This might in fact be
observed as the general fate of contemporary constitutionalism:
constituent and constituted power become inseparable, and traditional
checks on constituent power (rights norms applied by courts) become, as
they are transplanted across different national settings, mobile sources
of already constituted constituent power. As a result, the decision of
constituent power, which is supposed in classical constitutional doctrine
to underwrite all constitutional legitimacy," is dispersed into isolated
sources of validity at different points or tiers in the transnational
legal/political system. Democratically mandated actors thus merely
operate as bodies placed alongside other centers of legal force, and they
are defined and constrained by judicial bodies, deriving authority from
international judicial norms.12 The outcome of this is that, as is typical
under political systems with an elevated obligation to rights,
decision-making power becomes a recursive inner-legal function, and
courts, referring for their authority to higher rights norms, become
primary bearers of legislative power. 13
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INTERNAT'L L. 67 (2009);
Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Zur Herrschaft internationaler Gerichte: Eine
Untersuchung internationaler affentlicher Gewalt und ihrer demokratischen
Rechtfertigung, 70 ZEITSCHRIFl FOR AusIANDISCHES UND OFFENTLICHES RECHT (2010).
9. For discussion of the conventional status of courts as "the exact opposite of the
constituent subject" see Joel I. Col6n-Rios, Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin
America: The Cases of Venezuela and Colombia, 18 CONSTELLATIONS 365, 365 (2011).
10. This applies in particular to international organizations, such as the UN, whose
judicial norms are routinely incorporated in national law to underwrite new constitutions.
But this also applies to national constitutional courts, which often openly preside over
constitution-writing processes.
11. CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] 21 (1928) (Ger.)
(discussing constitutional legitimacy in the Weimar Republic).
12. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 8, at 65, 67, 69.
13. The classical historical example is the United States, where the Bill of Rights, and,
more especially, the Fourteenth Amendment, were intended (arguably, at least) to enable
courts to act as de facto lawmakers. For accounts of the role of rights in conferring
quasi-legislative power on courts, see ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT
127, 227 (1992) and Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990). On
the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment in this regard, see ROBERT J.
KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND
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This elision of constituent power and constituted power in the
actions of transnational judicial bodies, and especially in the judicial
application of rights, characterizes contemporary constitutionalism in
many ways. In particular, it characterizes contemporary
constitutionalism at the level of national and international public law,
and it characterizes the more informal constitutional order of the
distinct functional domains in transnational society.
I. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. A-constituent National Polities
One way in which judicial institutions and their rights
jurisprudence exercise constituent power is evident in public law at a
national level. As discussed below, this is seen in the rapidly increasing
prominence of national judges, especially those sitting on constitutional
courts, as political actors. 14 It is reflected in the near inevitability that
constitutional courts armed with strong powers of statutory review,
typically founded in international law and international rights
obligations, will act as primary (often founding) components of any
national constitutional order.
The growth of judicial power is a particular feature of new,
post-transitional constitutions, and transitional political systems are
typically shaped by the growing force of judicial power in a variety of
ways. For example, the rising importance of constitutional courts,
ensuring the primacy of international rights over national law, was
evident first in the democratic transitions in Germany and Italy after
1945.15 It was then cemented in the second wave of democratic
transitions of the 1970s, where judicial review, exercised to ensure
national compliance with international human rights standards, played
a vital role in the stabilization of democratic statehood in national
settings.'6 After this, constitutional courts, enunciating international
PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY 1866-1883, at 210 (1987). This of course does not imply
that the expectations attached to the Fourteenth Amendment were fulfilled.
14. See for classical analysis CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF
JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 11 (2002); Neal C. Tate, Why
the Expansion of Judicial Power? in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal C.
Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder, eds. 1995); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOcRAcY: THE
ORIGINS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
15. See my recent discussion in Chris Thornhill, National Sovereignty and the
Constitution of Transnational Law: A Sociological Approach to a Classical Antinomy, 3
TRANSNAT'L LEG. THEORY (2012).
16. See Ant6nio Araiijo, A Construvdo da Justiga Constitucional Portuguesa: o
Nascimento do Tribunal Constitucional [the Construction of Portuguese Constitutional
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norms as the basis for national laws, assumed the greatest prominence
in the reforms conducted in transitional states in the later 1980s and
early 1990s, at which time judicial actors clearly began to blur the
distinction between constituted and constituent power.
The patterns of judicial policy-making in many Eastern European
societies were at the forefront of this process. In Poland, for example,
courts of review assumed growing significance prior to the
pro-democratic upheavals of the late 1980s,17 and after 1989 the Polish
Constitutional Court authorized itself, through reference to
international rights standards, to initiate and to perform functions both
of normal legislation and-effectively-of constitutional foundation.' 8
This was paralleled in Hungary, in which the Court established under
constitutional amendments of 1989 clearly acted beyond the classical
functions of courts as constituted bodies, and it even directly initiated
key rafts of primary legislation.' 9 Borrowing authority from
international legal codes, both these courts used reference to
international accords regarding human rights to establish a normative
basis for lawmaking and constitution drafting in lieu of an assembled
constituent power.20
Justice: the Birth of the Constitutional Court], 30 ANALISE SOCIAL 881, 905 (1995) (Port.)
(providing an account of judicial review and the role it played in stabilizing democratic
statehood). See generally Pedro C. Magalhies, Carlo Guarnieri & Yorgos Kaminis,
Democratic Consolidation, Judicial Reform, and the Judicialization of Politics in Southern
Europe, in DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE IN THE NEW SOUTHERN EUROPE 138 (Richard
Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros & Dimitri. A. Sotiropoulos eds., 2006) (providing that
the causes and consequences of the creation of other types of political institutions, such as
the judiciary, have been widely neglected in regions such as Southern Europe).
17. Independent courts of review were unusual in Eastern Europe before the 1980s.
One was created, but never became operative, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. They also
existed in Yugoslavia. But it was only in Hungary and Poland that they played a
significant role before 1989. See generally CATHERINE DUPRt, IMPORTING THE LAW IN
POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RIGHT
To HUMAN DIGNITY 5-7 (2003); Mark F. Brzezinski & Lezek Garlicki, Judicial Review in
Post-Communist Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13, 31
(1995).
18. Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights in New constitutions of East Central Europe, 26
COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV. 164 (1994).
19. AndrAs Saj6, Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary, 15
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 257 (1995) (providing examples of the Court's philosophy that
"constitutionalism has to be interpreted under the 'unique and special circumstances of
regime transformation').
20. See RADOSLAV PROCHAZKA, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: ON FOUNDING ADJUDICATION
IN CENTRAL EUROPE 209-10 (2002) (providing that this was especially prominent in
Poland, prior to the enforcement of the 1997 Constitution). On the extraordinary
competence of the Hungarian court see Herbert Kiipper, V6lkerrecht, Verfassung und
Auffenpolitik in Ungarn, 58 ZEITSCHRIFI FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 267 (1998).
557
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
This process was soon reflected and intensified in other transitional
contexts. A prominent case was South Africa, where, in its second stage,
the constitution-writing process was placed under the guardianship of
the Constitutional Court, which was strongly authorized to activate
international law as the basis for domestic rulings and legislation.21
This was also a notable feature in some South American transitions. In
some parts of South America, even in settings marked by extreme levels
of social violence, by historically low degrees of judicial independence,
and even by an ongoing institutional attachment to weakly constrained
super-presidentialism, 22 the creation of courts with strong powers of
rights-based judicial review became an increasingly mandatory
institutional norm.23 In some South American societies, constitutional
courts and judicial institutions more generally became vital instruments
of democratic consolidation. 24 Notably, in Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Brazil, judicial review has become a vital pillar of the governmental
system.25 The case of Chile has particular distinction in this regard, as
the Chilean Constitutional Court, by initial design a repressive
instrument of dictatorship, provided cautious impetus for
democratic-constitutional reorientation towards the end of the Pinochet
21. See John Dugard, International Law and the South African Constitution, 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 77, 78 (1997) (providing that the Constitutional Court actively oversaw the
drafting of the constitution before it was approved).
22. Note the case in Argentina, where, after 1990, President Menem often governed, to
a large degree, by emergency decree, and he routinely promoted court packing to simplify
his prerogative system of authority. Even in this case, however, constitutional revisions of
1994 led (ultimately) to a strengthening of judicial power and autonomy. See on this
Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Evolution of Judicial Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing the
Rule of Law in an Ultrapresidential System, 36 J. LATIN AMER. STUDS 453 (2004); Gabriel
L. Negretto, Constitution-Making and Institutional Design. The Transformations of
Presidentialism in Argentina, 40 EUR. J. SOCIOLOGY 212-14 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Judicialization of Politics in Colombia: Cases,
Merits and Risks, 6 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 49, 49 (2007) (analyzing the judicialization of
politics in Colombia). See generally Pilar Domingo, Judicialization of Politics or
Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent Trends in Latin America, 11 DEMOCRATIZATION 104
(2004) (examining the judicialization of politics in Latin America with particular reference
to Mexico and Argentina); Patricio Navia & Julio Rios-Figueroa, The Constitutional
Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189 (2005) (mapping current
constitutional adjudication systems in seventeen Latin American democracies).
24. See LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 9 (2007).
25. See Julio Faundez, Democratization through Law: Perspectives from Latin America,
12 DEMOCRATIZATION 758 (2005). For discussion of the singularly powerful status of the
Constitutional Court in Costa Rica, see Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and
Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 218 (1998).
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regime.26 In recent and still ongoing democratic transitions, similar
processes can be observed. The tentative moves towards the
consolidation of democracy in many states in sub-Saharan Africa in the
last decades have commonly involved the establishment of powerful
courts applying rights-based jurisprudence to uphold constitutional
order.27 In recent regime changes in North Africa we can observe, in
heightened form, a process of judicial constitution writing, in which
courts assume a prominent-an abidingly contested-role in polity
building, and international norms, mediated through courts, create
parameters for primary acts of lawgiving, even against religious
backgrounds seemingly favoring alternative outcomes. 28
This judicializing tendency in national polities, however, is not
exclusive to transitional societies. Even securely established democratic
states, such as the United Kingdom and France, which are marked by
strong historical attachment to powerful sovereign legislatures and
entrenched opposition to judicial lawmaking and formal rights, are not
immune to the rising constitutional primacy of rights.29 These states
have also incorporated extensive procedures for rights-based review in
their constitutions, rendering them accountable to the case law of
international courts, notably the European Court of Human Rights
26. See ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE
JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 266 (2002) (describing the Pinochet regime and its
constitutional history).
27. For general comment, see Richard Frimpong Oppong, Re-Imagining International
Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception of International Law into National
Legal Systems in Africa, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. (2006); Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa:
Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L.
REv. 1241, 1242 (2006); Kwasi Prempeh, Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival": False Start or
New Dawn, 5 INT'L CONSTITUTIONALISM 505 (2007).
28. In the case of Egypt in particular there existed a powerful and semi-independent
judiciary before the fall of Mubarak, and encroachment on judicial autonomy was one
cause of revolutionary backlash in 2011. See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the
State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 883 (2003); Lama
Abu Odeh, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: The Limits of Liberal Political
Science and CLS Analysis of Law Elsewhere, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 985, 996-97 (2011). The
extent of the autonomy of judicial power created a framework for mobilization of
human-rights norms in Egypt. See generally Mona El-Ghobashy, Constitutionalist
Contention in Contemporary Egypt, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1590 (2008) ("[T]ackl[ing]
the problem of political-institutional change in undemocratic regimes commonly
considered impervious to meaningful political contention."). The Supreme Constitutional
Court has remained a powerful actor during the post-Mubarak interim, and it has
continued to exercise review of pre-constitutional statutes.
29. For specific examples, see Federico Fabbrini, Kelsen in Paris: French Constitutional
Reform and the Introduction of a posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation, 9 GER. L.
J. (2008).
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(ECtHR).30 The newly established primacy of rights in such polities
means that these political systems have substantially undermined the
autonomy of their legislatures, 31 ceded far-reaching lawmaking power to
courts,32 and, especially in the case of the United Kingdom, assumed a
new constitutional order without recourse to a classical or primary
constituent act.
These developments have imprinted a number of relatively common
constitutional hallmarks on contemporary national societies. First,
these developments result in a situation in which legislative decisions,
at the constitutional, statutory, substatutory and pre-statutory level,
are habitually shaped or even struck down by judges in constitutional
courts. In most national states, each act of sovereign legislation
co-implies close judicial scrutiny in light of international rights
obligations. Second, these developments have the outcome that national
legislatures integrate interpreters of rights as potent veto players in
their legislative procedures, such that uniform rights determinably
shape legislation even where they are not overtly applied to constrain or
reverse legislative decisions. 33 Third, and most importantly, these
30. See the UK Human Rights Act (1998), which was designed to "give further effect to
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights." For
comment on the constitutional implications of this see Jo Eric Kuhushal Murkens, The
Quest for Constitutionalism in UK Public Law Discourse, 29 OX. J. LEG. STUDS, 435-36
(2009).
31. See AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT 114, 275 (2009) (setting out that parliament did not grant the interpretive powers or
review to the courts); DANNY NICOL, EC MEMBERSHIP AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
BRITISH POLITICS 226 (2001) ("[T]he supervisory jurisdiction of the Divisional Court now
extends to declaring an Act of Parliament incompatible with Community law without
recourse to Luxembourg."); K. D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary
Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999) (noting the Human Rights Act of 1998
"represents an unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and the
legislature to the judiciary, and a fundamental restructuring of our 'political
constitution"'). See the account of the final 'painless death' of parliamentary sovereignty in
France, its traditional heartland, in ALEC STONE SWEET, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC (2008) (Yale L. School Faculty Scholarship
Series Paper 79). See also MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS:
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 24 (2009) (discussing fundamental
rights in the French and European judiciaries).
32. See Aileen Kavanagh, The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 24 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261, 267, 284 (2004)
(analyzing the court's distinction between interpretation and legislation).
33. See generally Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary
Models Resist Judicial Dominance when Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963 (2004)
(examining how the parliamentary right model "paradigm conceives of institutional roles
and responsibility or judgments about rights, with a specific focus on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act");
Loic Philip, Bilan et effets de la saisine du Conseil constitutionnel [Balance and Effects of
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developments have the consequence that, especially in transitional
contexts, courts often create and interpret a framework of constitutional
law ex nihilo. In such cases, courts have, to all intents and purposes,
assumed the (at least intermittent) capacity to exercise constituent
power and to embody constituted authority at one and the same time.
Across national divides, supra-constitutionalized rights are now
accorded a normative force in legislation, such that rights act as
authoritative surrogates for constituent power. Legislation is typically
and primarily proposed as legitimate if it accords with rights derived
originally from an international legal order. Polities require little
constituent force except that of actors enunciating rights, and, across a
spectrum of variations, national polities are increasingly formed by the
auto-constituted power of courts, which authorize these system-building
functions by borrowing constituent power from an already established
international legal domain.
B. A-constituent Multinational Polities
In analogy to this, a further way in which courts and their rights
jurisprudence assume constituent force in society is evident in the
politically formative role of courts in the public law of supra- or
transnational polities and supra- or transnational legal communities,
such as the European Union or-to a lesser extent-the World Trade
Organization (WTO).34 For example, it is widely accepted that, in the
emergence of the de facto constitution of the European Union, the law
courts-especially the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but to some
degree also the ECtHR-utilized powers of rights adjudication to
assume a position filled in more classical polities by constitutional
assemblies or elected legislatures.3 5 In particular, the ECJ, standing as
an example of "the highest degree of judicialization,"3 6 established a
doctrine of judicial supremacy and direct effect, which has brought
different national systems into convergence on key points of policy and
applied norms with effective constitutional standing across all member
Referral to the Constitutional Council], 4 REVUE FRANQAIsE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 988
(1984) (discussing the extension of the right of reference to the Constitutional Council).
34. See generally Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981) (providing a classical perspective).
35. On the ECtHR in this respect, see STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 317 (2006). On the role of the
ECJ as a 'permanent pouvoir constituant' see ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE
DER VERFASSUNG EUROPAs [ELEMENTS OF A THEORY FOR A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION]
401-03 (2001) (Ger.).
36. Carl Baudenbacher, Judicialization: Can the European Model Be Exported to Other
Parts of the World?, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 381, 391 (2004).
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states of the European Union. 37 One primary result of this is that supra-
or transnational legal obligations, not in their full constitutional extent
ratified by elected assemblies, acquire nonderogable status both within
the overarching polity of the European Union and within the
increasingly subsidiary legislative systems of constituent states.38
In the case of the ECJ, most notably, the always uncertain relation
between constituent power and constituted power is elided-almost
autologically-into a system in which the constituted power of a court
exercises the force of a constituent body and establishes a series of
constitutional norms to determine a founding legal order, having an
impact at a national and at a transnational level. 39 Through this
37. See the recent description of the ECY as the 'very locus of Europeanization' in
Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization and the Making of the EU
Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 3 (2010).
38. On the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome by the ECJ as a process leading
to a deep constitutional transformation of Members States, see Eric Stein, Gerhard
Casper, John W. Bridge, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat & Ami
Barav, The Emerging European Constitution, 72 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1978).
39. In the European Union, it is argued, there is "no scope for creation ex nihilo of a
distinctive constituent power." Neil Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case
of the European Union, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 247, 259 (Neil Walker & Martin Loughlin eds., 2007). See also
Neil Walker, Reframing EU Constitutionalism, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 149, 172-74
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (discussing multiple problems in the
drafting of any future European constitution). In agreement for different reasons, see JAN
KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2009);
PETERS, supra note 35, at 426. On the autonomy of European Union law, see critical
comment in Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis
of Possible Foundations, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 389, 395 (1996). For the classic study of
court-led foundation in the European Union, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). For detailed empirical accounts, see KAREN J. ALTER,
ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL
RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001); Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?:
European Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121 (1998);
Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 71 (1993) (setting out a highly illuminating account of the
ECJ as an institution leading integration by "transforming the political into the legal"); Id.
at 75 (establishing a European polity based in the autonomy-"the internally sustained
power"-of law). See also the claim in ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF EUROPE 65 (2004) that the ECJ has engendered a "constitutionalization" of the
European Union that is "binding upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal
regime." See also Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational
Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM.
POL. Scl. REv. 63 (1998) (arguing that transnational acts effect the way that the European
Community has integrated itself. For nuanced inquiry, see Griinne de Bdrca, Sovereignty
and the Supremacy Doctrine of the European Court of Justice, in SOVEREIGNTY IN
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process, the ECJ has been able to act as an institution conducting
constitutional supervision and review for a constitution that does not
formally exist, and which it itself, in the ongoing process of interpretive
review, factually and spontaneously (i.e. acting as effective constituent
power) promulgates, reinforces, and perpetuates. 40 Similar tendencies,
in weaker form, have been observed in the WTO. 4 1 In the European
Union, this a- or auto-constituent pattern of constitutional consolidation
has been made possible by, and has derived far-reaching legitimacy
from, the fact that the ECJ has assumed normative authority by virtue
of its claim to base rulings in prior international rights. 42 To be sure, the
ECJ's obligation to international rights norms was originally weak, and
it initially differentiated its jurisprudence from that of the ECtHR.43
TRANSITION 449 (Neil Walker ed., 2003). More recently, see the sociological account of this
in Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the
European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT'L POL. Soc. 128 (2008); Antoine
Vauchez, 'Integration-through-Law': Contribution to a Socio-history of EU Political
Commonsense (Eur. U. Inst., Working Papers RSCAS 2008/10, 2008).
40. Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 618, 619 (2006).
41. For the ascription of such functions to the Appellate Body of the WTO, see Joel P.
Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 623, 639-40 (2006); Deborah
Z. Cass, The 'Constitutionalization'of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation
as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39,
42, 44, 60, 71-72 (2001); DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM 22 (2005); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:
Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (2004).
For a contrast of the quasi-constitutional powers of the European Union and the WTO, see
Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (GrAinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001);
Peter Holmes, The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, in THE EU AND
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra.
42. See Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and
the EU: Towards 'Individual', 'Constitutional' or 'Institutional' Justice?, 15 EUR. L.J. 462,
478-79 (2009) (arguing that the European Union has claimed its legitimate existence
through the European Courts' protection of human rights); G. Federico Mancini & David
T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MODERN L. REV. 175, 179,
181 (1994) (discussing how the ECJ has used rights and the democratic principle to define
what is legitimate legislation); Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Europe's Constitutional Mosaic:
Human Rights in the European Legal Space-Utopia, Dystopia, Monotopia or Polytopia?,
in EUROPE'S CONSTITUTIONAL MOSAIC 97, 128-29 (Neil Walker, Jo Shaw & Stephen
Tierney eds., 2011) (discussing how judicial decisions from various sources like the ECJ
and the ECtHR can create a better body of human rights law in the European
Community); Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and
the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 629, 645 (2006)
(discussing the ECJ's reference to the ECHR as a source for rights jurisprudence).
43. See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?
Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1307, 1336
563
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
However, since the late 1960s, the normative power of the ECJ has been
increasingly underscored by its commitment to rights-based norms, and,
in response to challenges from national (especially German) courts, its
jurisprudence has been strongly influenced by the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and rulings of the ECtHR.44 In fact, the ECJ
originally designated itself as bound by a jurisprudence of rights. 45
Without specific authorization by the original European Economic
Community (EEC) treaties, the ECJ spontaneously constituted itself as
a constituent actor by claiming a mandate to apply rights as the basis
for its quasi-constituent acts and to review Community acts in relation
to fundamental rights norms. In so doing, it also independently defined
rights as constitutive elements of the normative order of the European
Union, able to override, and penetrate into, national laws. 46
This is evident in a number of landmark cases decided by the ECJ.
For instance, in Stauder (1969) and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
(1970), the ECJ accorded validity to its rulings by stating that rights
norms should be viewed as essential elements of European
jurisprudence, and it even insisted that fundamental rights needed to be
seen as "general principles" of European law.47 Against the background
of its recurrent jurisdictional conflicts with the
(2000) (asking if European law should be "freed from its function as an instrument of
polictically induced social change."); Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of
Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 12 LEGAL STUD. 227, 245 (1992) (arguing that while the
ECJ has grown more conscious of human rights issues, it is still reluctant to impose rights
protections over economic integration).
44. See LASSER, supra note 31, at 225; Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European
Human Rights Law, 71 MODERN L. REV. 183, 198-99 (2008) (discussing the development of
the relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR since the 1970s); Tobias Lock, The ECJ
and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship Between the Two European Courts, 8 L. & PRAC.
OF INT'L CTS. & TRIBS. 375, 377 (2009) (stating that European Member States are bound
by both Community law and the ECHR); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International
Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 445-47 (2003) (discussing the relationship between
the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court).
45. For general comment, see Mikael Rask Madsen, Human Rights and European
Integration: From Institutional Divide to Convergent Practice, in LAW AND THE
FORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW (Mikael Rask Madsen & Chris Thornhill eds., forthcoming 2014).
46. See GrAinne De Btrca, Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC Law, 13
Ox. J. LEG. STUDS 306 (1993). For more extensive analysis, see Chris Thornhill, The
Formation of a European Constitution: An Approach from Historical-political Sociology, 8
INT'L J. L. IN CONTEXT 354 (2012).
47. ANDREW WILLIAMS, EU HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES: A STUDY IN IRONY 145 (2004). It
is argued that through Stauder and subsequent cases the ECJ "fleshed out" an effective
Bill of Rights to support its rulings. Henri de Waele, The Role of the European Court of
Justice in the Integration Process: A Contemporary and Normative Assessment, 6 HANSE L.
REV. 3, 5 (2010) (Ger.).
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Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG), the ECJ explained its judgments in
Nold (1974) and Rutili (1975) through reference to the ECHR.48 By the
later 1980s, and especially after the BVG's acceptance of rights
thresholds applied by the ECJ in Solange II (1986), it became more
commonly acknowledged that human rights should be viewed as
forming core aspects of European jurisprudence and indeed of the entire
institutional architecture of the European Union.49 In Hubert Wachauf
v. Bundesamt fur Erndhrung und Forstwirtschaft (1989), notably, the
ECJ decided that actions of Member States should be reviewed for
compliance with fundamental rights. The Treaty on the European
Union now defines Art. 2 "respect for human rights" as a common pillar
of the European Union. Moreover, by 2011, the ECJ ruled, in Ruiz
Zambrano, that "the genuine enjoyment" of rights obtained by persons
"by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union" should be taken as a
normative ideal for its case law.5 0
Overall, consolidation of rights norms as a foundation of European
law is a core achievement of the ECJ, and the ECJ, interacting with the
ECtHR, has promoted quasi-constitutional rights jurisprudence through
concerted (although of course recurrently contested) collaboration with
other courts and other rights systems, in so doing solidifying its own
position within a network of rights jurisprudence.5 1 In consequence, the
48. For example, in Stork (1959), the ECJ stated that human rights norms were not
relevant to its jurisprudence. Yet, by 1974, as its controversies with the BVGH were
coming to a head, the ECJ declared in the Nold decision that "international treaties for
the protection of human rights" (thus including the European Convention) were to be
taken as "guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community law."
See Laurent Scheeck, The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration
through Human Rights, 65 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 850 (2005).
49. As early as 1984, it was stated that: "European integration through fundamental
rights is already occurring." See Jochen Abr. Frowein, European Integration through
Fundamental Rights, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 20 (1984-85). One recent commentator
even speaks of the "EU's Institutional Turn to Human Rights" in the 1990s. See Mikael
Rask Madsen, Human Rights and European Integration: From Institutional Divide to
Convergent Practice, in LAw AND THE FORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 45. See also Armin von Bogdandy,
Grundrechtsgemeinschaft als Verfassungsziel, 56 JURISTENZEITUNG 169 (2001).
50. On the implications of this, see Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Kottmann, Carlino
Antp6hler, Johanna Dickschen, Simon Hentrei & Maja Smrkolj, Reverse
Solange-Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU Members, 49 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 491, 518 (2012).
51. For a theoretical explanation of this, see Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism
and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 703 (1999) (discussing the effects of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the integration of
the European community and the role that the European Court of Justice has to play in that
integration); Andreas VoBkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional
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ECJ has applied rights to sustain the formation and circulation of
political power in a strict and specific disjuncture from any stable
assembled demos, in which each Member State has been brought into
convergence through vertical checking of domestic statutes against
norms asserting authority derived, in part, from human rights. 52 In the
effective constitution of the European Union, judicially-enforced rights
form institutions that reflect the specific absence of a constituent demos,
and they make it possible for the legal and political system to authorize
its acts and to perform functions of inclusion despite its inner
diffuseness and low organic integrity and at a very high level of
abstraction against firm, external, or constituent acts of will.5 3 Rights
provide a quasi-constitutional substructure to give support and
legitimacy to originally unfounded, or at least precariously supported,
acts of legislation.
Such examples reflect how, both nationally and supra- or
transnationally, contemporary society has in some cases begun to build
its constitutional form around an elision of constituent and constituted
power. If in classical conceptions of constitutional democracy,
constituent power formed an originally authorizing point of regress for
the political constitution, in contemporary society this status is widely
assumed by rights. The preponderance of rights and rights-based
institutions in the growing transnational constitution reflects a process
in which societies have manufactured consistency for legislation in a
highly recursive, often counter-factual fashion. Rights have made it
possible for political institutions to distill the basis of law's legitimacy
internalistically within the law itself If classical constitutions
Courts: Der Europdische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 175 (2010)
(discussing the integration and cooperation of European courts in the development of
constitutional law).
52. See generally Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The
Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1231,
1254 (2011) (asking if the European Court of Human Rights should engage in constitutional
or individual adjudication to deal with the broad range of human rights problems that now
confront it). One commentator describes a "triangle that has, at its vertices, the various
national supreme or constitutional courts, the ECJK, and the ECtHR" as propelling the
process of "constitutionalization" in the European Union. See Lech Garlicki, Cooperation of
Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdictions in Europe, 6 IN'VL CONSTITUTIONALISM 512
(2008).
53. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Importance of Being Called a Constitution:
Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, 3 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 332,
336-38 (2005) (arguing that the European Union has developed authority independent
from its member states); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 24 (2011) (discussing the implication of
political fragmentation in the European Union and how it leads to a reliance on
adversarial legalism).
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accounted for themselves as authorized by constituent power, standing
in an external relation to the law, 54 the constitution of contemporary
society is, to an increasing degree, authorized inner-legally by a
pre-constituted or endlessly auto-constituent power stored and
reproduced within the law in the form of rights.
II. THE SPONTANEITY OF THE TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAIN
A further way in which judicial actors and rights norms act
relatively autonomously to shape the contemporary constitution is
visible in the fact that, at different levels of transnational government, a
corpus of public law is emerging, whose normative basis is produced
through spontaneous acts of self-reference (or auto-constitution) within
the legal system.55 In this legal order, rights act, at varying societal
levels, in internally jus-generative fashion, and they give substance to a
self-contained body of legal norms, exercising effective constitutional
force across national borders.
The growth of a self-generated system of transnational
constitutional law is most obviously apparent at the level of formal
constitutional or public-legal organization in national politics. As
discussed, the principle that international law has a degree of primacy
over national law became pronounced in some national constitutions in
the first wave of democratic transition in the late 1940s.5 6 Now it is
commonplace for new constitutions to provide a priori (at least
hypothetically) for the eventual overruling of national legislation and
judicial process by international tribunals applying rulings invoking
international norms, obligations, and rights.57 The constitutions of
Russia and South Africa might be cited as among the most important
recent examples of this.58 In extreme cases, this culminates in the
54. This originates in Rousseau's idea that the legitimate state must be identical with
the will of all society, which must be entirely funneled through the political system.
55. That is to say, public law loses its classical foundation in constituent acts of a
sovereign will.
56. The 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany gave recognition, in
Articles 23, 24, 25, 26 and 100(2), to the precedence of international law over national acts
of legislation. This was also stipulated in Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution of 1948.
57. On variations in the application of this norm, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1996).
58. See the argument for the growing influence of international law on Russian
national law in Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 461-62 (1994). See also Dugard, supra note 21, at 79
(describing the power of the South African Constitutional Court to evaluate national laws
for consistency with international law). In South Africa, the Constitutional Court is
instructed by the Constitution to consider international legal sources in its rulings. This
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paradox that constitutional rule can be imposed in single states by
actors representing an international normative order, lacking
immediate democratic authorization,5 9 such that national constituent
power is implicitly pre-configured by a set of transnational normative
principles: constituent power is usually a constituted subject before it
even exists. However, the emergence of a relatively autonomous body of
transnational public law is also evident in supra- or transnational
polities, and in particular in the European Union. As considered above,
the ECJ's jurisprudence of supremacy has promoted a normative fabric
underpinning interstate relations throughout the European Union. This
jurisprudence now supports a recursive legal order, or a "circuit of
jurisdiction," which is close in normative force to a multi- or
transnational constituent power, and in which courts apply internally
binding norms (founded in rights) to national-state institutions.6 0 The
WTO forms an (albeit weaker) analog to this, and it invokes human
rights law to extend its power beyond simple functions of economic
dispute settlement and to pre-constitute laws of national states.61
Generally, international courts and other appellate actors have assumed
a remit that substantially exceeds conventional arbitrational functions.
They now increasingly focus on objectives of "norm-advancement": that
is, they invoke rights to shape acts of national legislation and, without
clear constitutional mandate, to construct a supra- or transnational
normative order. 62
was partly because confidence in indigenous law was low because of its association with
the apartheid regime. For analysis, see Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling
Charter: South Africa's Court grows its Constitution, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 34 (1997).
59. Philipp Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir
Constituant-Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East
Timor, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 423, 428-29 (2006); Noah Feldman, Imposed
Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 858 (2004-5).
60. Giuseppe Bronzini, The European Social Model and the Constitutional Treaty of the
European Union, in THE ECONOMY AS A POLITY: THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 183, 196 (Christian Joerges, Bo StrAth & Peter Wagner eds.,
2005). The tendency toward the promotion of spontaneous judicial lawmaking under
human-rights treaties was already acknowledged in more classical literature. See HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 263-67 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2011) (1933) (discussing conciliation through treaties as an alternative to
judicial settlement); PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43
(1983) (discussing the German principle that international treaties impose a duty on State
Parties to provide legislation and regulations to prevent the infringement of rights).
61. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 19, 24 (2000).
62. See the brilliant article Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power?
Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 73, 81
(2009). Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial
Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 198 (2011).
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In addition, it has been widely observed that contemporary
transnational society is developing an internally constructed and
relatively autonomous (auto-constitutedlauto-constituent) legal system
at a less formal level of constitutional organization. This is displayed in
particular in the increasing coalescence between different judicial
communities and the widespread transportation of legal rulings, norms,
and optimal procedures from case to case across national boundaries.63
In these processes, rights normally supply broad normative guidelines
that promote a judicial lingua franca to facilitate the translation of legal
rulings from one national jurisdiction to another.6 4 As a result, recent
years have witnessed an increasing comity of national and international
courts, through which, in semi-formalized fashion, courts help to
construct a system of trans-judicial norms, assuming effective
constitutional force in both national and transnational political
arenas.6 5 Indeed, it is possible to detect, at least in outline, the
emergence of a legal system close in design and standing to a fully
elaborated transnational constitution, in which higher-order norms
(expressed as rights) are established through international courts, and
national or local judicial actors assume (effectively devolved)
responsibility for interpreting and filling the legal gaps between these
norms. In this respect, courts act as bearers of delegated constituent
power to create, at a national level, a subsidiary constitution that is
derived, often without strict normative hierarchy, from the first-order
norms of international law.
In both of these respects, we can see the emergence of a recursively
founded transnational political constitution: that is, a pervasive
normative order, which arises from complex interactions between
different institutions (primarily courts), situated at different tiers of a
transnational political system. In parallel to this political constitution,
63. See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
272 (2009); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 194, 196 (1999) (exploring the
reasons that nations would adopt law from the European Community into their own
domestic laws). See an excellent analysis of the international enmeshing of national legal
structures through the rise of a transnational judicial community in Harold Hongju Koh,
How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1410-11 (1999);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2402
(1991). For a specific case study of the influence of international human rights law on U.S.
laws, see Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic
Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 408-12 (1985).
64. JACKSON, supra note 63 at 4-5. See also Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of
Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 305, 306 (2001) (discussing the body of transnational law,
including human rights law, that is neither national or international in origin).
65. See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT.'L
L.J. (2003); ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF
LAW 12, 301 (2011); Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 8.
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however, it is observable that rights assume far-reaching jus-generative
status beneath the threshold of what is normally identified as public or
specifically constitutional law: rights, in other words, also act
spontaneously to form a transnational subpolitical constitution. At one
level, this tendency has been identified in the proliferation of singular
private rights in most national societies.6 6 It has been widely noted that
norms arising from private litigation over personal rights increasingly
elaborate a rights fabric, which imposes quite strict and increasingly
uniform limits on acts of political legislation and gives potent normative
structure to social interactions in different parts of transnational
society.67 The production of rights-based norms through private
litigation is sustained and authorized on the basis of powerful supra- or
transnational presumptions in favor of singular rights.6 8 Yet private
litigation also acts in itself as a spontaneous source of
quasi-constitutional norms, able at once to curtail the scope of direct
state prerogative and expand informal and semi-private patterns of
normative orientation through society. International directives in
respect of human rights mean that private-legal cases concerning trade,
freedom of contract, migration, and mobility of labor have the capacity
to articulate and solidify a powerful rights structure in relative
independence of national governments and judiciaries. Such cases
exemplify the spontaneous and pluralistic constitutionalization of
transnational society.69 In this regard, even judicial actors with highly
66. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
67. See for recent discussion GRALF-PETER CALLIES & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 75, 166-68,
243 (2010). Elsewhere, we even read that, increasingly: "Private law performs a
state-breaking function." See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of
Globalization, 39 INT'L. L. & POLITICS 3 (2006).
68. See Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 28 (Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez, eds, 2001); MORITZ
VON UNGER, MENSCHENRECHTE ALS TRANSNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 28, 126 (2008).
69. For diverse analysis of this in different contexts, see Karen J. Alter, Private
Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22 (2006); David
Jacobson, New Border Customs: Migration and the Changing Role of the State, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 443 (1999). On this phenomenon in the European Union, see R.
DANIEL KELEMEN, The EU Rights Revolution: Adversarial Legalism and European
Integration, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 221
(Tanja A. Borzel & Rachel A. Cichowski eds., 2003); R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe:
Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 101 (2006);
Stephan Wernicke, Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice Between Member
States, Civil Society and Union Citizens, 13 EUR. L.J. 380 (2007). For a source clearly
sharing my view that reference to rights create flexible instruments for lawmaking and
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derivative authority assume primary legislative power to establish
normative structures and to provide legal cohesion across the limits
dividing originally geographically fixed jurisdictions. 70 It has been
tellingly noted in such instances that private litigation has notable
importance in producing or strengthening quasi-constitutional forms in
settings of weakly-centered political-systemic authority, in which rights
generated through litigation compensate for low state density and high
institutional fragmentation. 71
In conjunction with this tendency, we can discern a further
sub-political process of constitutional formation, in which rights have
assumed effective and highly abstracted jus-generative status in
transnational society. Specifically, this process of spontaneous
constitutionalization is induced by the fact that the transnational
political arena is increasingly populated by persons and organizations,
such as nonstate actors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
private governance bodies, and even private regulators and standard
setters, which at times utilize reference to rights to assume a position in
the margins of governmental process, from which they exercise a bundle
of de facto political and legislative powers. 72 Such organizations explain
legal inclusion, especially in weakly unified polities, see KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM, supra
note 53, at 236.
70. One excellent work on these questions argues that courts addressing
"transnational human rights jurisprudence" are "national and international courts at the
same time," and they generate a legal order whose inclusionary functions are necessarily
geographically disembedded. See VON UNGER, supra note 68, at 155.
71. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 51
(2001); Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry about Adversarial Legalism?, 17 Ox. J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997) (U.K.). This argument assumes particular salience in R. Daniel
Kelemen, American-Style Adversarial Legalism and the European Union (Eur. U. Inst.,
Working Papers RSCAS 2008/37, 2008); R. Daniel Kelemen, The Strength of Weak States:
Adversarial Legalism in the US and the EU (April 23, 2009) (unpublished paper presented
at European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference) available at
www.unc.eduleuce/eusa2009/papers/kelemen_10B.pdf. See also Robert Wai, Transnational
Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 471, 479
(2005) (discussing the advantage of transnational private law).
72. One prominent observer states simply: 'The principles of human rights are a major
source of legitimation for claims by non-state groups." See Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by
Non-State Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 494 (1992). NGOs are the
most important legislative actors outside strictly constructed governmental institutions.
For analysis of the legislative power of NGOs, see Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision Making
Institutions, 18 WASHINGTON Q. 48 (1995); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International
Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 572 (2000). On this general point, see Isabelle
Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31
VA. J. INT'L. L. (1991). For emphatic accounts of the positive status of nonstate and
nongovernmental actors under international law, see Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L. L. 978
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their functions and mandates in reference to transnationally
consolidated rights norms, and, to bolster their influence and perceived
legitimacy, they increasingly submit their activities in national spheres
of operation to effective judicial review by national courts.73 Where they
are capable of defining their operations as consonant with inter- or
transnational norms, these organizations assume authority to constrain
political decisions, to assume distinct and far-reaching governance
functions, to stimulate lawmaking initiatives, and even-effectively-to
make the law in the particular sphere of practice to which they refer.74
In this respect, rights facilitate an informal process of constitutional
elaboration, in which the essential institutional fiber of statehood is
spontaneously reconfigured, and private actors are fluidly incorporated
in the most essential functions of the political system.
In each of these dimensions, political and subpolitical, recent years
have seen the emergence of a new model of transnational constitutional
normativity. Effective constitutional norms underpinning acts of law are
produced without reference to sources of agency that are located
categorically outside the law, and norms with constitutional rank are
(2011); Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward
Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L.
& POL. 540 (2000); Peer Zumbansen, Die vergangene Zukunft des V6lkerrechts, 34
KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 59 (2001). Notably, NGOs are permitted to assume important
quasi-governmental and regulatory roles under certain Human Rights Conventions, in
particular under the African Convention and the Inter-American Human Rights system.
On the constitutional connection between NGO lawmaking and Human Rights norms in
the African Court of Human Rights see Frans Viljoen, A Human Rights Court for Africa,
and Africans, 30 BROOK J. INTERNAT'L L. 37, 54 (2004-2005). On the status of NGOs under
the Inter-American Court see Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The
Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STuD. 592, 579-645 (1999). On the consultative status of NGOs in the UN Human
Rights system see Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 5 MAX
PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 352 (2001). On other participants shaping the emergence of the
"transnational legal field," see Sigrid Quack, Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-
Making: A Case of Distributed Agency, 14 ORGANIZATION 645, 650, 655 (2007).
73. By this, I wish to propose that courts applying rights are able at once to regulate
acts of private bodies and to create a normative system that enables these bodies to
assume public functions. I found varying but illuminating commentary on this
phenomenon in Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs, National Courts Review of
Transnational Private Regulation 7, 9, 13 (Tel Aviv U. L. Faculty Papers 125) (2011) (Isr.);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2088
(2005).
74. FRANK VIBERT, THE RISE OF THE UNELECTED: DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW
SEPARATION OF POWERS 61-62 (2007); Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The
Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 579, 583 (2006) (U.K.); Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden, The
Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. &
Soc'Y 8, 11 (2011).
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authenticated in a highly autonomous, internalistic, and deeply
contingent fashion. 5 These norms do not emanate from, and they
cannot be simply referred back to, volitionally-centered democratic
actors. In many cases, even their essential status as law per se, or in the
strictest sense, is open to contest.7 6 This transnational constitutional
system widely relies on, and reproduces itself from, rights, and rights
have evidently begun to articulate quasi-constitutional norms at a
highly accentuated level of inner-legal abstraction, autonomy,
and-above all-recursiity.7 7  To an increasing degree, the
transnational legal order internalizes reference to rights in order to
construct normative structures and a regulatory design for society. As a
result, the law is able to regenerate itself from the law alone, and rights,
endlessly entered into law by law, become the generative principle for
law's auto-constitution.
III. MULTI-NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The net result of these tendencies is that the rising autonomy of
rights in contemporary society condenses a new pattern of transnational
constitutional governance, which comprises a multi-level and highly
pluralistic normative order. The broader constitutional drift from
constituent power to abstracted rights is distilled most clearly in the
fact that the emergent constitutional apparatus of transnational society
is marked by a high degree of multi-normative spontaneity.78 The most
optimistic theorists of global constitutionalism have historically followed
Immanuel Kant in claiming that the growth in potency of international
rights conventions is likely to engender a solid constitutional order,
75. The basic principle of classical constitutionalism is thus eroded.
76. See KLABBERS ET AL, supra note 39 at 98-99; David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 404 (2003); Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and
Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 269 (2009).
77. I refer here to the (contextually unrelated) argument proposed by Armin von
Bogdandy and others that the "basic principle of public law is human self-determination."
On my account, the fact that in global society the law is able to authorize itself through
rights means that it retains a distinct quality of publicness, even when emanating from
obviously multivalent or private sources. See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann &
Matthias Goldmann, Vdlkerrecht als dffentliches Recht: Konturen eines rechtlichen
Rahmens fur Global Governance, in DIE HERAUSBILDUNG NORMATIVER ORDNUNGEN:
INTERDISZIPLINARE PERSPEKTIVEN 228 (Rainer Forst & Klaus Giinther, eds 2011).
78. That is to say, because the political system as a whole is overwritten by rights,
many actors within the system can create laws, or at least directives with law-like status.
On such law, see Gunnar Folke Schuppert, The Changing Role Of The State Reflected In
The Growing Importance Of Non-State Actors in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF
NON-STATE ACTORS 222 (Gunnar Folke Schuppert, ed, 2006).
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which is close in standing, inviolability, and cohesion to the normative
pyramid of classical constitutionalism.7 9 The intuition underlying this
optimism-namely, that rights have become elements of a world
constitution-can be affirmed. However, rights do not assume such
constitutional status by defining or underpinning a strict
legal/normative hierarchy, which clearly obligates subordinate actors.
On the contrary, rights form a global constitution by acting as
reproducible and systemically internalistic elements of constituent
power, which articulate, in acts of quite spontaneous auto-constitution,
manifold and highly pluralistic premises for transnational norm
formation.80
The transnational process of pluralistic or polyarchical norm
construction has been hotly debated in recent literature.8' The character
of legal pluralism and the extent to which pluralism impacts different
states, regions, and legal systems have not yet been consistently
elucidated. 82 Moreover, the phenomenon of legal pluralism, both in law
79. The most extreme version of this view suggests that there exists a hierarchy of
international laws, some possessing erga omnes effect. As a result, national states are
constituted subjects in a constitution of international law, and they cannot exercise
powers exceeding this status. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). For a general cross section of the
global-constitutionalist literature, see HOFFE, supra note 2; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The
Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK
Y.B.U.N.L. 1 (1997) (Ger.); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution
of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 529 (1998); Louis Henkin,
Human Rights and State "Sovereignty,"25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 39-41 (1995); Stefan
Kadelbach & Thomas Kleinlein, International Law-A Constitution for Mankind? An
Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles, 50 GER. Y.B. INT'L
L. 303 (2007) (Ger.); Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional
Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALIsM 53 (2012)
(Ger.). See also Habermas, supra note 2. For a nuanced and discerning approach, see Anne
Peters, Global Constitutionalism in a Nutshell, in WELTINNENRECHT: LIBER AMICORUM
JosT DELBROCK 535 (Klaus Dicke et al. eds., 2005) (Ger.); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify
Their Interrelationships, 4 J. INT'L EcON. L. 3, 22 (2001).
80. This multiple inclusionary dimension to rights-based legal norms was already
intuited in a groundbreaking article on the integrative functions of rights in the USA. See
Talcott Parsons, Full Citizenship for the Negro American? A Sociological Problem, 94
DAEDALUS 1015 (1965).
81. See my survey of this in Chris Thornhill, National Sovereignty and the Constitution
of Transnational Law: A Sociological Approach to a Classical Antinomy, 3 TRANSNAT'L
LEG. THEORY 394-414 (2012).
82. See KRISCH, supra note 2, at 31; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and
International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621 (2009); Neil Walker,
Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context (RECON Online Working Paper No. 3,
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and in governance, has proved easiest to discern and to categorize in the
context of limited pluralism: for example in transnational quasi-polities,
such as the European Union, whose pluralism remains institutionally
circumscribed.88 Broadly, however, two transnational tendencies
towards legal pluralization can be identified. Both of these tendencies
are defined and impelled by the growing inner-legal abstraction of
rights, and in both tendencies rights and courts applying rights again
assume an effective auto-constituent status for transnational legal
order.
To illustrate these claims, first, rights shape a pluralistic or
multi-normative transnational constitution by solidifying an emergent
arena of inter- or transnational norms, which, in ways considered above,
enunciate principles and procedures that block certain, and create
constraints for other, sovereign-democratic legislative practices. In this
respect, the transnational constitution derives its structure from the
layering of national and inter- or transnational legal sources. One
outcome of this is that national courts appear as the "second layer" of a
transnational judicial hierarchy,84 and, in their capacity as mediators
between inter- or transnational and national normative orders, courts
utilize rights to build a suspended normative structure that decisively
preempts, shapes, and underscores legislation.85 Interpretation of laws
2010); Neil Walker, Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56 POL. STUD. 519 (2008)
(U.K.).
83. See, e.g., PouL F. KJAER, BETWEEN GOVERNING AND GOVERNANCE: ON THE
EMERGENCE, FUNCTION AND FORM OF EUROPE'S POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION 141
(2010); Christian Joerges, Conastitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Exploring a
Magic Triangle, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 339 (Christian
Joerges et al. eds., 2004); Kaarlo Tuori, The Many Constitutions of Europe, in THE MANY
CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 3 (Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2010) (discussing
constitutional pluralities); Christian Joerges, 'Deliberative Supranationalism'-Two
Defences, 8 EUR. L.J. 133 (2002); John Erik Fossum & Agustin Jos6 Men6ndez, The Theory
of Constitutional Synthesis: A Constitutional Theory for a Democratic European Union
(RECON Online, Working Paper 25, 2010); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Globalization and the
Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the
Nation State? (Eur. U. Inst., Working Paper No. 4, 2003) available at http://cadmus.
eui.eulbitstream/handle/1814/199/1aw03-4.pdf; Christian Joerges, How the Rule of Law
Might Survive the European Turn to Governance 14 (May 31, 2007) (unpublished paper
presented at NEWGOV Consortium Conference Project no. CIT1-CT-2004-506392)
available at http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/PUBLIC/NEWGOVCC2007-Contributio
nJoerges.pdf.
84. Moritz Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?, 26 J. INT'L
ARB. 533, 554 (2009).
85. This point is made in Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising
an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional
Order, 16 EUR. L.J. 511 (2010). See also Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting
the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177, 204 (1998). On courts utilizing rights to
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by different courts establishes a recursive foundation for constitutional
order, in which acts of constitutional foundation, statutory legislation,
and judicial interpretation cannot be strictly separated or distinctly
classified.86 This aspect of the transnational constitution is marked by
vertical or multilevel pluralism.
One further outcome of this first tendency, however, is that different
judicial actors (both national and inter- or transnational) contest
supreme jurisdictional power with one another, and many sources of
judicial authority are forced to exist side by side, such that their relative
rank or standing are uncertain.87 Courts (both international and
national), have central importance in connecting one level of the
nationallinternational polyarchical regime to another, and they
routinely act as nodal points, translating international norms into
directives for national policy. However, courts themselves perform this
function in a polyarchical fashion: the bounds of competence for
different courts are often unclear and conflicting and do not cement a
clear hierarchy of norms.88 This aspect of the transnational constitution
is marked by horizontal or multifocal pluralism.
For each of these reasons, national states increasingly operate as
one group of actors within a highly pluralistic landscape of
transnationally consolidated and overarching constitutional norms, and
the legislative functions of national states are constitutionally
determined by (often rival and overlapping) vertical and horizontal
normative forces. This gives rise to an intensely pluralistic
constitutional landscape, in which legal norms, no longer reducible to
evidently acceded democratic mandates, produce a clearly autonomous,
yet also only disputably obligatory, set of constraints for national
institutions.
cement their own quasi-constituent power, see Elina Paunio, Conflict, Power, and
Understanding-Judicial Dialogue between the ECJ and National Courts, 7 No
FOUNDATIONs 5, 20 (2010) (Fin).
86. See Oliver Gerstenberg, Expanding the Constitution Beyond the Court: The Case of
Euro-Constitutionalism, 8 EUR. L.J. 172, 190 (2002).
87. For excellent discussion, see Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European
Human Rights Law, 71 MODERN L. REV. 183, 184-85 (2008).
88. See Carl Lebeck, The European Court of Human Rights on the Relation Between the
ECHR and EC-Law: The Limits of Constitutionalisation of Public International Law, 62
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 195, 217 (2007) (Ger.). See generally Miguel Poiares
Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of
Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 39, at 356; Miguel Poiares
Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional
Pluralism, (IE Law Sch., Working Paper No. WPLSO8-02, 2008) (examining the role of the
Court of Justice in the context of constitutional pluralism) available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1134503.
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Second, rights shape a multi-normative transnational constitution
by virtue of the fact that, across the sectorial divides in transnational
society, they create a secondary, less formal constitutional apparatus,
which also permits, reflects, and reinforces a fragmentation of the
jurisdictional power and normative monopoly vested in
national-democratic legislatures. In this respect, the pluralistic layering
of private and public legal sources give rise to the transnational
constitution. This constitution may come into being in one of many
ways. For example, this constitution may be formed through litigation
over private rights: in particular, it may be created by judicial
controversy, in which private litigation in national courts entails the
invocation of international norms to support rulings, such that
transnational expectations in respect of rights assume horizontal
constitutional power (i.e. through third-party effect) in, and through,
courtrooms.89 This constitution may also be constructed through the
spontaneous constitutionalization of functional sectors outside the state,
either through the growing power of private/corporate actors to specify
rights establishing binding norms for their relevant spheres of
exchange, or through the use of rights norms borrowed from judicial
institutions to enable the amalgamated hybridization of private and
public authority.9 0 Moreover, this constitution may be produced through
the status of rights as institutions that act normatively to unify distinct
realms of formally private social practice, running laterally across
national boundaries.9 1 An example of this might be found in media law
where international service providers accept formative guidance by
international rights standards to increasingly promote a constitution,
89. See FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIoLATIONS:
USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTs 39, 45-46, 56, 250 (2001). For studies of ways
in which such processes assume impact even in polities traditionally resistant to
international normative directives, see Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism
Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law Before U.S.
Federal Courts, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651 (2005); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort
Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L J.L. 53, 57 (1981).
90. See Christoph Engel, A Constitutional Framework for Private Governance, 5 GERMAN
L.J. 197, 233 (2004); Christoph Engel, Hybrid Governance across National Jurisdictions as a
Challenge to Constitutional Law, 2 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 569, 583 (2001) (U.K.); Kalypso
Nicolaidis & Gregory Schafer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance
Without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 263, 302 (2004); Vandenbergh, supra
note 73, at 2039. Centrally, see GUNNAR FOLKE SCHUPPERT, GOVERNANCE UND
RECHTSETZUNG. GRUNDFRAGEN EINER MODERNEN REGELUNGSWIRTSCHArT [GOVERNANCE
AND REGULATION. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MODERN ECONOMIC REGULATION] 386
(2011) (Ger.).
91. See the general claims in GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS:
SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
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focused solely on media, which overarches national boundaries, and
which may, in some cases, conflict with national constitutional norms. 92
A further example may be found in medicine, where medical suppliers
increasingly construct a transnational normative order focused solely on
medicine that is able to constrain national state authority by enacting
and promoting international human-rights standards in respect of
medical provision.93 All such cases can legitimately be seen as
constitutional processes, in which rights offer functionally localized
constituent power to diverse social actors and organizations.
In all such instances, a legal order is reinforced, in which
expectations regarding rights perform functions traditionally accorded
to constituent actors. This creates a diffuse, functionally localized, and
informal constitution, which relies on, and recursively reproduces,
autonomously constructed rights. Indeed, this informal constitution is
founded through reference to rights as ultra-contingent and
auto-constituted sources of constituent norm formation.9 4
To conclude, in the different dimensions of the transnational
constitution, a condition of extreme, simultaneously geographical,
sectorial, and functional polyarchy is increasingly identifiable. This
polyarchical constitution lacks firm societal or volitional foundations.
However, at each of its levels, it obtains some degree of internally
inclusionary cohesion because courts, other judicial actors, and private
agents recognize and apply rights as structural points of orientation.
These actors also recognize that justiciable rights are claimed by, and
allocated to, private agents in society, and that rights are cemented as
the basis for policy-making both by private and by public bodies. The
emergence of a global system of governance is underpinned by a
92. Consider recent controversies attached to Google in China. Consider also the
Australian High Court ruling in Dow Jones & Co v. Gutnick (2002), in which, albeit
without final success, human rights agreements were considered as instruments for
providing a common standard for transnational disputes regarding the potentially
defamatory content of Internet sites.
93. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Die anonyme Matrir Zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch
'-ivate" Thznsnationale Akteure [The Anonymous Matrir On Violations of Human Rights by
'Private" Transnational Actors] 44 DER STAAT. ZEITScHRIFT FOR STAATSLEHRE UND
VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE, DEUrscHEs uND EUROPAISCHES OFFENTIcHES RECHT [THE STATE.
JOURNAL OF POLTICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC
LAw] 161 (2006) (discussing whether fundamental rights not only obligate States, but also private
transnational actors) (Ger.).
94. For Teubner, rights have no structural or normative cause, and they draw content
solely from contingent acts of law's "self-production" and "self-control." See Gunther
Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie
[Global Civil Constitutions: Alternatives to a State-Centric Constitutional Theory], in
STAATSVERSTANDNISSE [CONCEPTIONS OF STATE] at 117, 139 (Riidiger Voigt, Vol. 11, 2007)
(Ger.).
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proliferation of rights, occurring both at different governmental levels
and as attached to private agents.95 That is to say, rights connect the
national to the inter- or transnational dimension of global order: they do
this mainly through the intermediary functions of courts. Further,
however, rights connect the public to the private dimension of global
order: they do this mainly through the ability of courts to provide a
normative structure to regulate private activities, and through the fact
that private bodies can assume governance functions if they show
compliance with rights expectations. In this latter respect, rights make
it possible for political institutions selectively to incorporate private
actors without forfeiting their normative public structure.9 6 In short,
rights are transferred from one level of the global governance order to
another, and they form the recursive constitutional foundation for its
(always precarious) cohesion and extension. The ability of different
layers of the governance apparatus to obtain support in and to
effectively vindicate rights provides structure and orientation for the
global governance regime in its totality,97 and rights form the
underlying reference for a highly disparate set of constitutional forms,
each of which solidifies normative order in a highly pluralistic and
politically uncentered fashion.
IV. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
In each of its dimensions, the emergent constitutional form of
contemporary society reflects, at a surface level, a dramatic
transformation of conventional constitutional functions. Evidently, the
contemporary constitution exists independently of singular democratic
mandates or acts of legislation, and it is defined by the fact that
judicially enforced rights provide a highly detached, cross-boundary
normative substructure both for primary acts of polity building and for
specific acts of legislation and regulation.98 Similarly, at a more
substructural level, this constitution performs multiple functions of
normative inclusion, each at a high degree of spontaneity, uncertainty,
and contingency, and it applies rights to authorize legislation in an
extremely iterable, internal, and abstracted manner. In both respects,
95. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
96. See Vandenbergh, supra note 73, at 2090.
97. See Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 763, 795 (2006).
98. For claims in agreement see Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino, Between
Constitutional Tolerance and Judicial Activism: the 'Specificity'of European Law, 10 EUR.
J.L. REFORM 99-100 (2008).
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the contemporary constitution establishes a deeply internalistic political
system, in which the original external reference of the political system,
expressed in the idea of constituent power, is superseded. Rights,
recursively entered and re-entered into the political system, construct a
matrix for the ongoing reproduction of society's political structure in
highly self-determined, highly contingent, and highly internalistic
fashion.
In this respect, the emergent constitutionality of modern society
reflects an inner adaptive dimension of society's self-organization, and it
responds to a specific functional condition of modern society as a
whole.99 In fact, the nascent constitutional form of modern global society
constructs a political system that is acutely molded to the changing
functional exigencies of contemporary society.100 On one hand, the
generality of rights acting as surrogate or preconstituted constituent
power has become most visible under conditions where political power is
utilized across societal realities marked by decreasing
national/geographical cohesion and uniformity, diffuse social agency,
and complexly embedded, pluralistic normative claims.lol Under such
conditions, political actors struggle to generate or presuppose immediate
or unequivocal forms of legitimacy, and they are required to produce
and authorize legislation in a rapidly iterated manner, with limited
opportunity for testing or manifesting support located outside the
political system. 102
Against such backgrounds, however, the implementation of
generalized rights as the basis for political institutions has made
possible the emergence of a political system that is able to perform
99. By this, I mean that the reconstruction of the transnational political system around
rights needs to be seen as a process through which the system stabilizes its functions in
relation to broad shifts in its social environment-especially to the rising extension,
acceleration and complexity of the environments to which law needs to be applied.
100. Such changing functional exigencies could be categorized as follows: social
requirement for laws that can be extended across wide geographical and cultural
distances; the need for rapidly iterable laws; the need for more laws; the need for laws
that can be easily reused in multiple settings.
101. The specific link between rising judicial power is addressed critically by Ran
Hirschl. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). But it is also addressed in a
rather more balanced sociological manner by Jacques Commaille. See for one example
Jacques Commaille, The Janus Model of Legal Regulation: Changes in the Political Status
of Justice, 2 RcCS ANNUAL REVIEW (2010).
102. By this, I mean that in classical (national) political systems the legitimacy of law
was, at least notionally, dependent on its approval by an external constituency. In
societies where law is applied rapidly and across national boundaries, however, this
external constituency does not exist, and such approval is impossible to secure. The switch
from constituent power to rights allows societies to adapt to this fact.
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processes of inclusion and regulation in a highly internalistic and fluidly
reactive fashion. This system is in a position to positively conduct acts of
legislation in a manner that is sensitive to the rapidly changing
requirements for, and the growing volume of, law that is produced by
contemporary society. 103 In particular, the reference to rights as an
auto-constituent explanation for law has allowed political actors to
cement within the law abstract normative foundations for relatively
secure legislative acts, and to evade the incessant need to produce
quantities of external/volitional legitimacy to sustain each act of
legislation. By internalizing a potent reference to rights, a transnational
political system (incorporating states and other political actors) has
evolved that is able to store, and to accompany its power with, simple
forms of internal legitimacy whilst responding to complex societal
demands for multiple, contingent, and rapidly changing normative
inclusion and legislation. This means that the political system can
manufacture and multiply its power across society without direct
reliance on external supports or sources of legitimacy. This also means
that, as power is applied to designated bearers of rights, the classical
self-limiting function of constitutional norms is preserved, and the
political system occludes itself against uncontrollable conflation with
other spheres of practice and exchange. In both respects, rights have
promoted a multi-leveled abstraction of inclusionary power as an
alternative to conventionally centered (national) polities. They have
made it possible for societies to translate reserves of power originally
attached to distinct and clearly identifiable constituent actors into a
societally abstracted medium, applied across society at a high level of
internal autonomy, transnational inclusivity, and functional specificity.
The rising prominence of political rights in the transnational
constitution can thus be explained from a socio-functional perspective.
Actors within the political system now show increasing dependence on
rights as a norm to underwrite power: reference to rights means that
political actors can more easily respond to demands for multiple and
complex inclusion, and they utilize rights to construct reserves of
political power marked by substantial inner abstraction and structural
autonomy. This growth in the autonomy of law (through rights) is
103. The rising demand for law is specifically a feature of national societies whose
intersection with global society is widening. See my preliminary discussion of the case of
Russia in Chris Thornhill, National Sovereignty and the Constitution of Transnational
Law: A Sociological Approach to a Classical Antinomy, 3 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 446
(2012). For similar processes in Brazil, see Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira,
Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach 99 WASH.
UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1010 (2006). But the escalating need for law can be observed
quite generally as a characteristic of globalized society, and this need underlies the growth
in complex and informal modes of lawmaking identified above.
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induced by the fact that-to an increasing degree-the law is needed for
extremely variable patterns of inclusion. It is applied across very
divergent transnational societal environments, and its ability to
presuppose any original or external identity between itself and its
objects or addressees is restricted. Moreover, it is induced by the fact
that society, in its rising transnational complexity, needs a constantly
escalating amount of law. In this reality, rights assume structurally
augmented significance for the legal and political system of global
society. They play a vital role in enabling the legal transmission of
power across society, and they multiply the capacities for lawmaking
possessed by a society as a whole. The transnational constitution
applies rights to validate the use of power and law specifically because
the existence of a simple democratic mandate, or even a firmly
legitimated institutional structure, for power's exercise cannot be
presupposed, and the growing inclusion of objects (persons) under law
needs to be undertaken across precarious and acentric environments, in
an internally flexible and normatively self-referential fashion. As
discussed above, rights enable the law to internalize a stable normative
account of its authority, to construct an internal (auto-constituted)
image of its constituent author, and to internally iterate a justification
for itself across widening and increasingly diverse social terrains. In
this respect, the auto-constituent force of rights has proved functionally
essential to the expansionary reproduction both of political power and of
law in contemporary society.
On this basis, we can conclude that rights have begun to express an
effective code for the emergent transnational political system. That is to
say, where contemporary society encounters a requirement for
institution building and political structure, it expresses this
requirement through reference to rights, and it cements norms for
spontaneous institutional formation by explaining institutions as
authorized by rights. The rights/not-rights dichotomy becomes the
recursively auto-constituent device by which a society distinguishes
those exchanges that require political regulation from those that do not,
and rights form a functional language which allows society to translate
certain events, subjects and phenomena into a register that is
immediately recognized as intelligible to the political system.
To be sure, spheres of functional interaction located outside politics
(in the strict sense) also avail themselves of rights as instruments of
systemic self-organization. For instance, exchanges in medicine refer to
rights, which are not necessarily or intrinsically political; the same
applies to exchanges in art, science, education, religion, intimate
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relationships, and so on.104 Indeed, in such cases, societal exchanges are
likely to phrase themselves in reference to rights in order to specifically
ensure that they are not exposed to political control.105 Rights in
religion, love, art, or education reduce the contamination of such
exchanges with characteristic political contents. This is the general
function of private rights as principles that uphold the complexly
differentiated fabric of society in its totality, and in fact specifically
depoliticize many societal exchanges.106 Yet, the reference to rights in
medicine, science, art, family, intimate life, or in any other areas of
social relations, does not only reflect the differentiation of such
exchanges from politics. On the contrary, the reference to rights can also
be perceived as reflecting an intrinsic interface between any given social
system and politics, and, in each sphere of practice, rights commonly
describe the exchanges throughout society which have a particular
susceptibility to become political.107 Rights instill a residual political
structure in society, through reference to which the political system can
104. Regarding rights as inner dimensions of an emergent constitution of the medical or
healthcare system, one commentator examines the production of medical rights in the
following terms: 'The practice of informed consent in the clinical arena evolved primarily
through the medical profession's responses to various decisions by the courts (establishing
civil and criminal liability for unauthorised medical interventions), but in some legal
systems it has now, together with the right to bodily inviolability, gained the status of a
fundamental right. Due to the link to principle of autonomy, dignity, and the human
rights discourse, that practice began to be perceived as a paradigm of medical ethics and it
now penetrates human rights instruments concerning biomedicine and bioethics and
relevant documents of medical practice, including the Council of Europe Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine (i.e. the Oviedo Convention) together with its Additional
Protocols, UNESCO Declarations on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997),
Human Genetic Data (2003), and Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), the Ethical
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects were established by the
Nuremberg Code in 1947, and further developed in the subsequent WMA Declaration of
Helsinki." See Atina Krajewska, Global Health on its Way to Self-Constitutionalisation:
Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Global Health Law (unpublished MS, on file with
author), preliminary version presented at University of Cardiff (December 2012).
105. The example above of an internally generated medical right
would-presumably-have the outcome that exchanges regarding medicine could operate
in relatively self-regulating fashion, requiring only exceptional internalization in the
political system.
106. This is Luhmann's view of rights. See the seminal account of rights as institutes
that trace the limits of society's politics in NIKLAS LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALs
INSTITUTION: EIN BEITRAG ZUR POLITISCHEN SOZIOLOGIE [FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS AN
INSTITUTION: A CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY] 135 (1965) (Ger.).
107. By this, I mean that rights trace a political code at that moment where they
express demands for regulation which structurally presuppose the intercession of the
political system in other spheres of practice.
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organize and explain its reactions and interventions.108 Medical
exchanges, for instance, cease to be simply medical where they entail a
conflict or infraction of rights, or where conflicts regarding the authority
and legitimacy of medical practices are formulated in relation to rights.
Similarly, the political bracketing of intimate relations through rights
becomes its antithesis as soon as such relations are recorded as exposed
to endemic rights violations or where the legitimacy of certain
conventions raises controversies expressed through rights claims. The
same applies to exchanges in art, science, education, and so on. 109
Exchanges outside the political system articulate their requirement
for political power, in short, through claims to rights and through
perceived derogations of rights, and society registers a need for
political-structural formation in a vocabulary provided by rights. The
translation of social exchanges into the grammar of rights is the process
in which a society objectively expresses its emergent political structure.
In general, the reference to the rights code is a (typically submerged,
but always latently constructed) societal device that makes possible the
creation of relatively stable inclusionary mechanism for the use of
political power that are underscored by reasonably coherent distinctions
between law and nonlaw or politics and nonpolitics, under conditions
where this would otherwise be impossible.
It is often observed that, in its multi-structural spontaneity, the
transnational constitution of contemporary society marks a radical shift
away from politically centered social order, and it builds up reserves of
counter-power in which different socio-functional contexts produce
highly differentiated inner normative systems." 0 Arguably, however,
108. In other words, where the political system intervenes in medical exchanges, in art,
in religion, it is likely to do so, either ideologically or otherwise, in the name of rights, and
it is likely to articulate its exchanges through rights. This might occur positively, e.g. to
guarantee rights to health or treatment in medicine. This might occur negatively or
prohibitively, e.g., when political actors intervene in exchanges linked to religion owing to
security concerns.
109. See the case of potential conflict between rights of privacy and rights of personal
security and freedom from violation discussed in KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 142. Such extreme conflicts regarding the primacy
of one right over another would seem to create a necessity for the intervention of a third
party: that is, the political system, enunciating political principles to define the relative
hierarchy of contested rights.
110. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Luhmanns Staat und der transnationale
Konstitutionalismus [Luhmanns State and Transnational Constitutionalism], in DIE
STAATEN DER WELTGESELLScHAFT. NIKLAS LUHMANNS STAATSVERSTANDNIS [THE STATES
OF WORLD SOCIETY. NIKLAS LuHMANN's CONCEPTION OF THE STATE] 99, 109 (Marcelo
Neves & Rildiger Voigt eds., 2007) (Ger.) (analyzing the development of a global
constitutional pluralism which can not be traced back to international law or politics but
must rather be understood as transnational).
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the converse is the case. Through its concentration around rights, the
transnational constitution develops as a multi-faceted instrument for
irrigating power and for solidifying distinctive reserves of legal/political
power through a weakly strictured society. Indeed, reference to the
rights code enables society spontaneously to designate certain
exchanges as political, and, accordingly, to build reactive political
structures. Rights thus act, ex nihilo, as the founding principle for the
politicality of today's deeply acentric society. Moreover, the reference to
the rights code enables this society to meet its demands for the
application of political power in a highly improvised and spontaneous,
yet also consistent and internally authorized fashion. To this degree, the
reference to rights as the founding principle of law's authority enables
the political system to generate more power in order to cover its
exchanges through society, and it allows it to transmit this power in
highly recursive fashion. Expressed differently, whereas under classical
constitutional doctrine the political system was based in one decision,
and it was obliged to refer to this decision for its authority, the modern
transnational constitutional system, founded in a fluid rights code, is
able to multiply its decisions in a process of rapid internal iteration,
and, by promoting rights as the foundation of law's authority, it can
quickly apply law to emergent conflicts and regulatory demands."'
Underlying all the processes described above is the fact that modern
societies encounter and endlessly stimulate a need for more law to
address the complex and ultra-interdependent objects for legislation
that they encounter and engender. This need cannot be satisfied
through traditional techniques for mobilizing consensus, support, or
even resources of legitimacy positioned externally to the political
system. The modern political system is obliged to promote highly
internalistic reserves of legitimacy (based in rights), and the resultant
rights-based judicialization of political decision-making enables the
political system, to some degree, to extend its reserves of power, and to
generate a volume of legislation adequate to exponentially rising
societal expectations.112
111. For a theory of the decision as paradigmatic for the conditions of contingency in
modern society, see MICHAEL TH. GREVEN, DIE POLITISCHE GESELLScHAFT. KONTINGENZ
UND DEZISION ALS PROBLEME DES REGIERENS UND DER DEMOKRATIE [THE POLITICAL
SOCIETY. CONTINGENCY AND DECISION AS PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY] 14
(1999) (Ger.).
112. This is observable as a general phenomenon. But it is a particular feature of
societies in transition from authoritarian to rights-based constitutions that the reference
to rights (and ensuing potentials for litigation) makes it possible for them rapidly to
expand their capacities for producing law. For examples see Egardo Buscaglia, Corruption
and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 POL. STUD. 273, 275 (1996); Kevin J. O'Brien &
Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 THE
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V. POST-CLASSICAL OR NEO-CLASSICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
The constitutionality of contemporary society is typically contrasted
in profound fashion with common ideas of classical constitutionalism,
which define constitutional norms as sources of legal-political
"countervailance": that is, as a corpus of laws acting to constrain the
power of sovereign states.113 Apart from purely normative constructions
of the constitution, which see contemporary global norms as replicating
original models of national order," 4 the perception of the constitutional
uniqueness of contemporary society unifies all (otherwise disparate)
examinations of the status and content of the emergent global or
transnational constitutional order. From the perspective outlined above,
however, it is only a rather superficial approach to constitutions, which
insists on the presence of a radical breach between the inner form of the
transnational constitution and earlier, more classical constitutionalist
designs. In fact, the growth of abstracted constitutional rights as
primary components of contemporary transnational political order can
easily be seen to reflect a more general logic of constitutional
governance. If approached from a functionalistic perspective, the
emergent transnational constitution gives strong manifest expression to
certain potentials that were always implicit in constitutional forms.
Indeed, it is arguable that the global form of the contemporary
constitution was already, albeit in submerged fashion, functionally
co-implied in the classical form of the national constitution.
To illustrate this, if we look beneath the literal self-reflection of
classical constitutionalism, we can see certain deep functional
continuities between contemporary and classical constitutional models.
In the first instance, for example, if detached from their literal
normative construction, classical constitutions clearly acted as
instruments in society in which the legal/political system was able to
underwrite and authorize its own abstraction, and the normative
elements of classical constitutions played a vital adaptive role in
enabling the modern political system to utilize and transmit its power in
CHINA J. 75, 86 (2004). As discussed above, it is generally noted that rights allow courts to
assume legislative functions.
113. See ScOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT
ATHENS TO TODAY 16 (2002). For discussion of a constitution as 'limited power" see
ANDRAS SAJ6, LIMITING GOVERNMENT. AN INTRODUCTION To CONSTITUTIONALISM 2
(1999).
114. Mauro Cappelletti, Nicessit et Ljgitimitj de la Justice Constitutionnelle
[Necesssity and Legitimacy of Constitutional Justice], 33 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT COMPARe [INT'L J. COMP. L.] 625 (1981) (Fr.).
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a flexibly positive fashion 115 The characteristic internalism or
auto-constitutionality of the contemporary constitution was in fact
visibly anticipated by classical constitutions. Classical constitutions
were designed quite specifically as institutions that formed a
legal/political order able to authenticate itself without relying on
external actors and singular sources of external legitimacy, such that
they were able to reproduce political structures across society at a high
degree of autonomy. Indeed, this was already evident in the classical
doctrine of constituent power, which purported to found the
legal/political system in radically external acts of norm-giving volition.
The original doctrine of constituent power, proclaiming the origin of
law's legitimacy as external to the political system, always masked the
fact that the political system utilized this principle, through its
filtration through rights, to detach itself from external agency, and to
regenerate its power by supplying a recursive internal authorization for
its functions. The principle of the external relation between constituent
power and the state is deeply interwoven in the Rousseauian
self-explanation of modern democratic society as characterized by
collective self-legislation. 116 Yet, the externality of constituent power
was always, dialectically, an internality, and the concept of constituent
power always formed a projection, through which the emergent modern
political system could imagine itself as externally authorized while in
fact excluding external agents (the people) as originating sources of law.
Constituent power instilled an idea of external legitimacy within the
political system, through reference to which the political system could
autonomously-that is, internally-reproduce its power. This is clearly
illustrated by the earliest theoretical discourses on constituent power.117
From its first formulation, this concept was always in itself a paradox: it
was the essential foundation for a political system able to procedurally
measure and restrict the factual presence of the people in government,
115. A related point-namely, that the "the principle of democracy" is a "formula of
self-reference" in the political system-is made in Niklas Luhmann, Machtkreislauf und
Recht in Demokratien, 2 ZEITSCHRIFI FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 164 (1981).
116. See generally Dieter Grimm, Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus-Eine Kompensation
flir den Bedeutungsschwund der Staatsverfassung? [Social Constitutionalism-A Compensation
for the Vanishing Importance of the Constitution?], in STAATSRECHT UND POLITIK FETscHRIFT
FOR ROMAN HERZOG ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. CELEBRATORY PUBLICATION
FOR ROMAN HERZOG'S 75TH BIRTHDAY] 67 (Matthias Herdegen et. al, eds., 2009) (Ger.).
117. The classical concept of constituent power invoked by Sieyis was designed at once
to found a revolutionary political system, but then, immediately subsequent to its
constitutional foundation, to ensure that its founders fell silent and remained outside the
political system. See EMMANUEL-JOSEPH SIEY9S, PRtLIMINAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION:
RECONNAISSANCE ET EXPOSITION RAISONEE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME & DU CITOYEN
[PRELIMINARY CONSTITUTION: RECOGNITION AND REASONED EXPOSITION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE CITIZEN] 19, 21 (1789) (Fr.).
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and so to reproduce its exchanges through society in an internally
self-authorizing fashion. 118 Constituent power was always a
self-authorization (auto-constitution) of the political system. 119 To this
degree, the internalism of the contemporary political system merely
makes literally explicit the paradoxical, functional subterfuges of
classical constitutions.
Further, if analyzed in light of their submerged functions, it is
observable that classical constitutions also sustained the autonomy of
the political system via a surrogation of constituent power through
rights.
This means, first, that, although classical constitutions claimed to
draw legitimacy from a constituent power standing before all other legal
institutions, these constitutions had their origins in a social
environment in which the exercise of constituent power was inseparable
from the exercise of rights. The drafting of the first modern
constitutions was generally a process in which the assertion of
constituent power was clearly seen as an exercise of a prior
constitutional right, and constitutions were designed to give material
form to rights that already existed.120 In the revolutionary United
States and revolutionary France, most notably, the claim to act as
constituent power was essentially coterminous with the claim to rights,
and the fabric of constituent power was always suffused with and pre-
defined by rights: constituent power was only expressed as a claim for
rights, and it was in fact pre-constituted by rights. 121 In the first modern
118. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 148 (1989); William R. Casto, James Iredell and
the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 330 (1995).
119. In this regard, note the claim, regarding the assertion of constituent power in the
American Revolution, that "Federalists embraced the authority of the collective sovereign
as the means of establishing the Federal Constitution. Yet many were reluctant to
acknowledge, much less encourage, the role of the people as the ruler." CHRISTIAN G.
FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 150-51 (2008). Note also the related observation that "For
Federalists popular sovereignty was a powerful constitutional fiction. While the people
possessed all sovereignty, they parceled it out among different institutions and
jurisdictions." DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 229
(2005).
120. It is argued, tellingly, that in the United States rights were presumed to have
constitutional status even before the state constitutions and the federal Constitution were
written. See Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in
U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
571 (1989).
121. The logic of rebellion against the Stamp Act and other coercive statutes in early
revolutionary America was expressed, normally through courts of law, as an attempt to
protect demonstrable rights. Jack Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or a
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constitutions, therefore, the distinction between constituent and
constituted power was never clear, and constituent power always
possessed an inner juridical dimension.
This means, second, that, once classical constitutions were
established, constituent power remained present and configured in the
constitution, not as power exercised by a factually existing people, but
as power exercised by an aggregate of people qua rights holders. The
entire classical doctrine of constituent power in fact implied that the
people (the nation) are integrated in the political system as the people
under higher law, and higher law is presided over by courts, and applied
in the form of rights.122 Legislation produced by the political system is
then authorized through reference to the constituent people as rights
holders, standing above and prior to the factually existing electoral
people, and the original will of the people is always conserved,
represented, and expansively re-enacted through the rights
Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackermann's Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1940
(1999). Rights defended in this way already existed as elements of a formally
acknowledged constitution. On this point see Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief
Historiography of Judicial Review, 20 J. POLY HIST. 6 (2008). The resultant logic of
constituent assembly, in which claimants to rights began to found new centers of
government in different British colonies, was motivated by similar principles. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 29, 122 (1998). In
France, analogously, the impulse towards the revolutionary assertion of constituent power
after 1789 was shaped by a widespread demand for equal juridical entitlements,
abrogating the uneven, corporatistic, and highly privileged rights structure of the Ancien
Rdgime. Although rights had less formative importance in revolutionary France than in
the United States, the norm of shared and equal rights in law impelled the assault on
singular and corporate legal privilege which first gave rise to the idea of republican
sovereignty and constituent power in the summer months of 1789. EMMANUEL SIEYkS,
QU'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS-ETAT? [WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE?] 45 (1970) (Fr.). Here too,
constituent power was expressed as part of an existing (or at least imagined) rights-based
constitution. See the analysis throughout in ARNAUD VERGNE, LA NOTION DE
CONSTITUTION D'APRtS LES COURS ET ASSEMBLtES A FA FIN DE L'ANCIEN RtGIME [THE
IDEA OF THE CONSTITUTION ACCORDING TO THE COURTS AND ASSEMBLIES AT THE END OF
THE OLD REGIME] (1750-1789) (2008) (Fr.).
122. Contrary to perceptions fostered by Carl Schmitt, there was a strong doctrine of
constituent power in the American Revolution. This was tied to the belief that courts
should act as guardians of a higher law (especially rights). See the argument in Thomas
Tudor Tucker, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party
Prejudice, in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at
606 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). See also Hamilton's famous
argument in THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). In France, by 1795 the
doctrine of revolutionary constituent power had also assumed a pronounced judicial
dimension. By the end of the Thermidorian Reaction, Sieyds argued for a constitutional
jury to protect higher law against statute. In so doing, he hoped "to stabilize the polity by
limiting the participatory dimension of constitutional politics." Marco Goldoni, At the
Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyds' Constitutional Jury and the Taming of
Constituent Power, 32 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 211, 233 (2012).
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jurisprudence of the courts. 123 The internalization of constituent power
in the political system thus occurred primarily through rights, and
rights remained a recollection in the political system of its original
constituent founders, which could be endlessly invoked by both
legislative and judicial actors to accompany and confer validity on acts
of legislation. 124 By conserving an image of constituent power in rights,
the political system was able to autonomously reproduce its power
across society, to internalistically authorize acts of law, and
spontaneously to multiply the volume of law that it was able to
generate. At a very early stage in the development of constitutions,
rights became depositories of auto-constituent power within the political
system.
In both of these respects, early constitutionalism formed a
conceptual apparatus in which rights projected external legitimization
for the political system, but in which, factually, the political system
constructed itself internalistically around rights. Standing as a cipher
for constituent power, rights enabled the running self-reflexive
reproduction of the political system, and they enabled rapid and
autonomously authorized structure-building processes through society.
In fact, from the outset, rights formed an effective code for the political
system. In the early constitutional state, the construction of the rights-
relevant/rights-irrelevant dichotomy became the essential basis for the
reproduction and social transmission of political power.125
123. In the post-Founding United States, the growth of the federal judiciary, and thus
the legal inclusion of the nation as a whole, was sustained by the use of rights norms to
support legal rulings and processes of statutory review. See Jordan J. Paust, On Human
Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective
Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 572-74 (1989). At this time, proponents
of national government saw nationhood as founded in the shared protection of rights. See
CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES. THE MEANING OF THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 8 (2005). These proponents of a strong national judicial and
executive system used rights norms derived from early international law to expand and
justify the political system. See Andrew Lenner, A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism
in the Federalist Era, 40 AMER. J. LEGAL HISTORY 73, 75 (1996). One historian states that,
in the formulation of early doctrine and practice in revolutionary America, the
"fundamental premise" of judicial review resided in the "ultimate sovereignty of the
people." See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 232 (1995).
124. For analysis of Madison's view of the direct relation between the sovereign
constituent will and the functions of courts reviewing parliamentary legislation, see
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
946 (2000).
125. That is, the use of rights within the political system made it possible both to
legitimate power across society but to insulate the political system against unmanageable
inclusion-rights were the precondition of politics, in the modern sense of the word.
Tellingly, in fact, one historian describes eighteenth-century (pre-constitutional) France in
590
A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUENT POWER
The role of rights in promoting the internal abstraction of the
political system assumed clear and manifest shape in the extended
wake of most classical processes of constitution making in the later
Enlightenment. After the initial explosion of constituent fervor in the
later eighteenth century, it became evident in most post-revolutionary
societies that the centration of modern political systems around an
external constituent people was not sustainable, and claims for the
foundation of the political system in external (constituent) power soon
diminished.126 Indeed, constitutions quickly assumed the specific
function of enabling political systems to dispense with external
reference, and they distilled a formal paradoxical premise for the
normative autonomy and internalism of the political system. This
occurred through two separate constitutional trajectories (discussed
below), both of which followed classical moments of revolutionary
constitutional formation. The internalization of constituent power in the
political system by rights played a vital role in both of these trajectories.
In some cases, notably in continental Europe, the proto-democratic
impetus of constitutionalism in the French revolution was rapidly
weakened: by 1795 this impulse was palpably flagging (although it
extended still, in attenuated form, to Cadiz in 1812 and Norway in 1814,
and it reasserted itself more widely in 1848).127 After this juncture, the
political system was in most cases consolidated around a minimal
constitutional order, and legislation was authorized through society by
reference to social actors, not as agents participating in public will
formation, but rather as bearers of limited private and civil (not
primarily political) rights. 128 In this respect, as Marx intuited, European
constitutionalism in the nineteenth century was never definitively
distinguishable from Bonapartism. 129 In other cases, notably in the
United States, the proto-democratic impetus of revolutionary
foundation, although it did not disappear, also soon lost some of its
the following simple terms: "politics in the modern sense of the word did not exist." See
MICHAEL SONENSHER, WORK AND WAGES. NATURAL LAw, POLITICS AND THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH TRADES 46 (1989).
126. With a small number of exceptions, after 1795 few constitutions drew primary
legitimacy from constituent power, and this principle all but disappeared as a source of
legal authority.
127. The Spanish Constitution of 1812 was based in national sovereignty (Art 3). The
Norwegian Constitution of 1814 still contained far-reaching provision for democratic
legislation (§ 49).
128. This re-orientation is expressed in exemplary fashion in BENJAMIN CONSTANT,
tCRITS POLITIQUES [POLITICAL WRITINGS] 589-619 (1997) (1819) (Fr.).
129. See generally KARL MARX, DER ACHTZEHNTE BRUMAIRE DES LouIs NAPOLEON [THE
EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis NAPOLEON] (Dietz Verlag, 1960) (1852) (Ger.) (making
use of the historical as a basis for further development of his theories, analyzing social
class war).
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potency. 130 In this setting, however, the idea of external democratic
formation of the political system was replaced by a court-led system of
legitimization and socio-political integration, in which law courts
applying rights (notably rights in property) assumed primary
responsibility for transmitting legislation, building political structures,
and expanding the political system's cohesive form and its inclusionary
hold on society at large. 13'
In both lines of post-revolutionary polity building, the fact that the
constitution internalized an account of its constituent authority in the
form of rights (stored either in private or civil law, or in the jurisdiction
of courts) was the most important mainspring for the ongoing
reproduction and stabilization of the political system. The establishment
of normative order across society was driven, at the most fundamental
level, by the systemic internalism of rights. Rights formed institutions
that allowed both the legal system and the political system to operate as
parts of a fully autonomous domain in society, the basis of whose
self-reproduction was always stored within the system itself.132
At one level, in the evolution of the modern political system, rights
formed a vocabulary in which different social exchanges could explain
130. In the American Founding, the commitment to full democracy was always limited,
and in the Federalist Papers a clear distinction was made between Republic and a
democracy. James Madison also spelled out a theory of constituent power, dividing the
organs of government from the will of the people, that had the effect of transferring power
to the courts. See FEDERALIST No. 53. The first decade of the new Republic witnessed an
expansion of the legal apparatus, which was increasingly formalized and structured
through reference to rights expectations, as a means of national consolidation. Famously,
judicial expansion was treated with great skepticism by more democratically minded
actors in the early Republic, for instance Thomas Jefferson. For one account of this vast
subject see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY. LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICs OF
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 59 (2012).
131. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920, at 23, 25, 27, 28 (1982). For an
alternative perspective on the system-building power of courts see Larry Kramer, The
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 270, 272 (1992). This role of
courts was reinforced in the later twentieth century. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, LAWYERS
BEFORE THE WARREN COURT: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1957-66, at 39 (1972).
On this general function of rights in promoting legal unity within the legal/political
system see CHRISTIAN STARCK, VERFASSUNGEN. ENTSTEHUNG, AUSLEGUNG, WIRKUNGEN
UND SICHERUNG [CONSTITUTIONS. CREATION, INTERPRETATION, EFFECTS AND SECURITY]
124 (2003) (Ger.).
132. On the correlation between rights and the differentiation of law and politics see again
LUHMANN, supra note 106, at 185; Niklas Luhmann, Staat und Politik. Zur Semantik der
Selbstbeschreibung politischer Systeme, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 15:
Politische Theoriengeschichte. Probleme einer Teildisziplin der Politischen Wissensschaft 112
(1984).
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their relevance to, and demand inclusion, in the political system. 133 In so
doing, rights allowed the political system selectively to distribute its
power through society, to weaken alternative sources of power, and
gradually to suffuse society with generalized reserves of political
power.134 Yet, at the same time, rights ensured that most societal
exchanges obtained a structure in which their factually intensified and
collectively resonant inclusion in the political system was restricted. 135
133. In classical constitutionalism, we can observe that rights were drawn from a
pre-formed social register, and they acted to transpose interests in society which were
already well consolidated (e.g., rights of conscience, rights of free movement, free labor,
contractual liberty, and, above all, property) into a positively founding political
vocabulary. For historical background, explaining how vital rights cemented in
revolutionary American constitutionalism were initially cemented in Britain, see for
example P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 85-90 (1979); Louis
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1958). For my discussion of
the state-building function of rights see, throughout CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF
CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE (2011). On rights formulated in England as formative of the basic grammar
of constitutionalism in the early revolutionary United States see John Philip Reid, In an
Inherited Way: English Constitutional Rights, The Stamp Act Debates, and the Coming of
the American Revolution 49 S. CAL L. REV. 1123 (1976); A.E. Dick Howard, Rights in
Passage: English Liberties in Early America in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES. THE
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 4, 5, 10 (Patrick T.
Conley & John P. Kaminsky, eds, 1992).
134. The formation of the United States as a conclusively national society can easily be
seen as a process in which rights gradually-albeit with dramatic lapses-saturated
society and brought all persons and exchanges under even and equal control. The 6poques
of most accelerated nation building and state consolidation (foundation, Reconstruction,
Civil Rights movement) all witnessed the implementation of rights by federal courts as
institutions for eliminating private power and consolidating society as a uniform legal
arena. On the later stages of this process, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174, 183
(2004). The extent to which this argument can be applied to Reconstruction is of course
controversial; the claim that in the 1870s the Supreme Court performed an "emasculation
of national civil rights enforcement authority" is still typical. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 179 (2005). Yet for alternative views, see
PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011);
Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 39, 39, 40, 63 (1978).
135. In America during the Founding, by way of illustration, rights were clearly used
restrictively to define the conditions under which single persons could obtain access to, or
participate in, the political system. Even in the earliest state constitutions, the growing
emphasis on singular rights reflected a skepticism towards fully inclusionary Republican
legislatures. See, for example, the analysis of the Constitution of Vermont (1777) in
William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 701 (1985). On the general relation between
rights-based judicial review and scepticism about the power of legislatures during the
593
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
Rights dictated the conditions under which exchanges needed to be
politicized, and they ensured that most social exchanges did not speak
in an eminently political voice.136 To this degree, rights performed
classical self-limiting functions for the political system. Rights thus
developed as constructs that policed both the inclusivity and the
exclusivity of the political system, and they facilitated the autonomous
and functionally specialized distribution of law and power across
widening and increasingly acentric societies. Although classical
constitutions explained and legitimized their authority through
reference to constituent power, it was the fact that the political system
distilled constituent power internalistically, in rights, that proved the
abiding functional legacy of classical constitutionalism. This was
fundamental to the emergence of the legal/political system as a
differentiated, relatively autonomous arena of exchange, able reliably to
perform its functions in respect of adaptive law production.
It is notable in these respects that the original formation of
constitutions coincided with a dramatic geographical extension and
decentration of modern society, and constitutions assumed great
importance in allowing societies to politically adapt to such
conditions.137 Early constitutions enabled societies to react to their
growing scale and complexity by formally abstracting a legal/political
order, in which norms could be transplanted and reproduced across
rapidly widening social horizons, and in which the recurrent
requirement for an external underwriting of law and political power
through particular decisions, interests, or acts of concrete participation
could be rendered unnecessary.138 Moreover, the drafting of early
constitutions coincided with an accelerated differentiation of society,
meaning that legal and political actors were required to articulate their
functions and generate an increasing volume of legislation at a high
level of inner contingency and insulation: constitutions provided
Founding see Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1054, 1060 (1997).
136. For theoretical background, see LUHMANN, supra note 106.
137. Clearly, in both France and the United States, classical constitution writing
coincided closely with the formation of societies as nations, and thus with the extension of
socio-political order beyond personal and local power structures. On the relation between
nationalism and central institution building see WILLIAM P. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF
NATIONALISM: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 18 (1967).
138. One commentator observes incisively on the way in which rights-based review
made it possible for the political to distinguish between "democracy and something we
might (stipulatively) call popular sovereignty," and to define its legitimacy through the
latter term. See Robert C. Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 437 (1998).
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internally hardened formulae to stabilize these exchanges across
pluralistic and increasingly complex social environments.13 9
For both reasons, classical constitutions and the rights that they
contained made it possible for society as a whole, in its increasingly
complex form, to accept the palpably evident impossibility of its
centration around localities, persons, and volitional decisions (either
singular or collective). Rights-based constitutionalism also allowed
society to use law and power as disembedded, pluralistically
reproducible media of exchange. At a founding sociological level,
therefore, early national constitutions and the rights that they
contained expressly enabled emergent modern societies to distill legal
and political resources into a form that could be effectively utilized
across complex social terrains. 140 In particular, constitutions allowed
modern society originally to compensate for the fact that, owing to its
inner contingency and progressively differentiated pluralism, it could
not constantly muster specific external authority for its legal and
political activities, and through the formation of constitutional law the
modern political system managed to construct a set of principles able
both to sustain its inclusivity yet also to reduce its reliance on external
support. In organizing its politics around constitutions, society was able
to presuppose law and power as stable resources despite the acentricity
of its overarching structure, and even to insulate law and power against
disruptions from its highly contingent environments. Society preserved
itself against its own growing complexity through the internalistic
normative order generated by constitutions and constitutional rights. As
the basic code of the emergent political system, reference to rights (as
depositories of constituent power) had the vital sociological significance
of allowing society to construct, to internally extend, and to recursively
reproduce autonomous structures of legal/political inclusion.
If classical constitutions are subject to functionalist reconstruction
in this manner, it appears that many aspects of the diagnosis of an
epochal change or deep caesura in the constitutionality of contemporary
global or transnational society are based in a rather simplified
literalistic view of classical constitutions. In fact, on the account given
above, the internalistic and auto-constituent form of the contemporary
transnational constitution extends the submerged functional substance
of classical national constitutions. Above all, the abstracted autonomy
and the self-referentiality of the contemporary legal apparatus are
functionally extracted from the classical pattern of constitutionalism. In
the constitutional order of contemporary society, the original function of
139. See my general discussion in THORNHILL, supra note 133.
140. Id.
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constitutional rights in intensifying the inclusivity of the legal and
political system as distinct from physically localized constituent power
and in enabling contingent legal and political inclusion of changing
social objects reaches a point where the law is able, to a large degree, to
autonomously reproduce and authenticate itself and to spontaneously
generate multiple inclusionary norms from a location inside its internal
apparatus. The reduction in importance of constituent power discussed
above, in consequence, does not reflect a weakening in the substance of
classical democracy: it reflects a broader sociological process, in which
the political system has learned to translate its legitimacy from an
external location (constituent power) into an internal location (rights) in
order to maximize its autonomy and adaptability. This makes it possible
for a political system to evolve which is no longer centered solely around
sovereign authority, yet which nonetheless generates and disseminates
political authority in reasonably coherent, explicable fashion. In the
contemporary constitution, therefore, rights retain and intensify their
residual function as the form of abstraction for political power. They
continue to operate as institutions generating fluid reserves of political
power, and they remain the decisive source of inclusionary cohesion for
even the most pluralistic and multi-environmental societies. 141 The
self-referential authorization of law and power through rights, in fact, is
the enduring principle by which contemporary society, in its
differentiated pluralism, organizes its inclusionary operations:
exchanges are integrated into society's diffuse legal/political systems
through their reference to rights, and rights allow the law to build
temporary political structures and to assume some degree of inner
consistency in regulating even the most scattered and seemingly
disconnected phenomena. In the emergent constitutional system of
transnational society, constituent sovereign power is, to a large degree,
ceded to rights. Rights act, self-generatively, as the primary force of
institutional construction and legal/political inclusion. But in this
respect, the contemporary constitution serves, not to contradict, but in
fact to intensify, the functional logic of classical constitutionalism.
In this analysis, to be sure, it needs to be clear that, even if
examined from a functionalist standpoint, there are undeniably aspects
of the emergent contemporary constitution that possess a clear
distinction against classical constitutions.
For example, we can identify a clear novelty in contemporary
constitutionalism in the fact that the application of rights now
habitually extends beyond the legal/political system in the classical
141. For overlapping comment see CHRISTIAN SEILER, DER SOUVERANE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT
ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATISCHER RucKBINDUNG UND OBERSTAATLICHER EINBINDUNG 229 (2005).
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sense of the word. As discussed, this is evident in the fact that a
governance system is emerging in which strict lines between private
and public law have become fluid, and both regulatory and effective
lawmaking functions are widely assigned to originally private actors.142
As a result of this, political institutions acquire intensified capacities for
rapid structural formation, and they respond to requirements for
legislation in a hyper-sensitively adaptive manner.143 This is made
possible, to a large degree, by the fact that legal and political functions
are typically overwritten with a highline rights code: that is, that legal
and political functions are defined, and separate themselves from other
functions, through reference to rights. Under the sanction of this code,
political objectives can be fluidly allocated to a variety of institutions,
and various organizations can assume constituted status as distinctively
public or political. Rights thus construct a number of actors and
organization as political. In this respect, rights clearly widen the
contemporary system beyond conventional constitutional limits, and
they enable the conduct of political functions by actors within a fluidly
extensible political periphery.
In addition to this, one distinctive feature of the constitutionality of
contemporary society is that rights formulate normative orders for
social exchanges in a sectorally or functionally specific, nationally
cross-cutting fashion. Indeed, at the very center of the concept of the
transnational societal constitution is the principle of functional
auto-constitutionality: that is, namely, that one functional domain can
autonomously generate a normative apparatus for its exchanges, and
these exchanges stabilize themselves as normatively independent of
conventionally centered resources of the legal and political system.144 In
this respect, we can observe that the capacities for auto-constituent
organization of social exchanges always implied in constitutionalism
have migrated beyond the determinate confines of the political system,
and they regulate exchanges not conventionally classified as political.
142. A Constitutional Framework for Private Governance, supra note 90, at 219, 233.
Generally, rather than simply following the increasingly common suggestion that private
bodies and state actors have experienced an amalgamation, it seems more sociologically
useful to observe ways in which societies distinguish some exchanges as specifically
public. For an extreme version of the amalgamation thesis, see Larry CatA Backer, Private
Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the
Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STuD. 751, 757 (2011).
143. As discussed above, the modern political system is able to generate laws at many
levels, and it can incorporate many diverse actors within the lawmaking apparatus.
144. This is Gunther Teubner's contribution. See FISCHER-LESCANO & TEUBNER, supra
note 3; Teubner, supra note 93; Teubner, supra note 94.
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On the basis of the functional analysis of rights proposed in this
article, however, we are inclined to retreat before declaring that even
these more unprecedented or hyper-contingent aspects of the nascent
transnational constitution form a wholly sui-generis dimension of
contemporary constitutional law. On one hand, the fact that rights
stimulate the emergence of new patterns of private/public governance
preserves a continuum with the political dynamic of classical
constitutions. In such processes, law's internal reference to rights
increasingly creates a normative apparatus in which private actors can
be securely co-opted into the periphery of state power, and state power
can be devolved to private agencies. Nonetheless, the reference to rights
also means that the conduct of public functions by private bodies can be
subject to judicial control and placed within a politically regulated, even
distinctively public-legal, framework.145 As a result of this, private
bodies are assimilated into the extended periphery of statehood, and
responsibilities traditionally assigned to designated legislatures and
public office holders can be conducted in a much more flexible, positively
reactive fashion. Rather than reflecting an erosion of classical
constitutional principles, this accentuates the capacity of classical
constitutions for generating rapid and unfounded structures of political
inclusion. On the other hand, the relatively spontaneous generation of
norms in different functional sectors of society also articulates more
pronouncedly the internal logic of classical constitutionalism. Law's
internal reference to rights enables different spheres of functional
exchange to elaborate an inner legal/normative structure, so that
transnational legal exchanges (in medicine, sport, media) can be
conducted and regulated in reasonably predictable fashion, even where
locally centered political authority is weak. In this respect, the primary
impulse of society's emergent constitutionality is to extend the functions
of classical constitutions, and to utilize rights to promote abstracted,
145. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 30, 33 (2004). Also on the role of courts
in integrating private governance bodies into the state structure, see Joanne Scott & Susan
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 565, 576 (2006). For a point that is similar to mine, see Anne Peters, Privatisierung,
Globalisierung und die Resistenz des "Verfassungsstaates" [Privatization, Globalization and
the Resistance of the "Constitutional State'", in STAAT UND VERFASSUNGSTHEORIE IM
SPANNUNGSFELD DER DISZIPLINEN [STATE AND CONSTTUIONAL THEORY IN THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE DISCIPLINES] 128, 149 (Philippe Mastronardi & Dennis Taubert eds., 2006)
(Ger.). On the preservation of "meta-rules" in global private law despite extreme legal
fragmentation, see the outstanding analysis in Moritz Renner, ZWINGENDES
TRANSNATIONALES RECHT. ZUR STRUKTUR DER WIRTSCHAFrSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES
STAATES [On the Structure of the Economic Constitution Beyond the State], 220 (2011).
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counter-factually sustained inclusion.146 In both respects, rights provide
a register in which society can politicize itself (i.e. obtain consistent
structures for the transmission and reproduction of power), and rights
intensify their original function in enabling political inclusion in the
absence of any specific will, decision, or external norm. In each case,
rights play a vital role in modern complex society by providing a set of
running constitutional norms, which are able to create a matrix for the
constitution of semi-political and notably public-legal order in a rapid
yet consistent fashion and against extremely contingent and rapidly
extensible environments.147 As such, transnational rights reflect a deep
connection with the original functions of constitutions, and their
original capacity for constructing an improbable and autonomous basis
for political power is clearly re-expressed.
In sum, we can suggest that the progressive formation of a
transnational constitutional order, shaped by the rising autonomy and
the pluralistic internality of rights, in many ways re-articulates the
sociological functions always inherent in the design of constitutional
democracy. We might identify those aspects of contemporary
constitutionality that deviate most obviously from classical
constitutionalism as replicating the functions of classical constitutions
in that they create an internally reproducible normative order, which,
from within itself, builds political structures across society and creates
improbable normative orders against highly variable and contingent
societal backgrounds. Above all, we might suggest that contemporary
constitutionality is marked by a proliferation of the original function of
rights in distilling constituent power as an inner element of the political
system. As in classical constitutionalism, rights police the boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion in the political system, and in doing this, they
fulfill their deepest function as institutions enabling the
self-reproductive and autonomous extension of consistent political
structures across society. If rights originally articulated the irreducible
premise for the autonomy of the political system, this premise has now
wandered beyond institutionally-centric political systems. However, its
basic function in creating contingent political structures for society
remains unchanged.
146. By this, I mean that classical constitutions, based in constituent power, extended
patterns of legal inclusion across expanding national societies. Rights-based constitutions
now retain this function, albeit in societies marked by far more contingent and uncentered
inclusionary processes and requirements.
147. On the creation of a flexibly extensible transnational legal culture through rights,
see NILs CHRISTIAN IPSEN, PRIVATE NORMORDNUNG ALS TRANSNATIONALES RECHT?
[PRIVATE NORM ORDERS AS TRANSNATIONAL LAW] 29 (2009) (Ger.).
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CONCLUSION
At many different levels, we can concur with more established
analyses of contemporary supra- or transnational constitutionalism in
their claim that the abstracted autonomy of rights, the transfer of
competence from legislatures to unelected actors, the diffusion of
democratic power, and the resultant rise in the judicialization of politics
are processes which, in quasi-revolutionary fashion, redefine the legal
order of modern society. In particular, courts acquire structural
centrality in the system of contemporary global governance, and
through their extended functions they form and reproduce the basic
fabric of a highly acentric transnational constitution. As discussed, even
beneath the clearly determined political arena, extended judicial
functions currently exert a high degree of inner-sectorial constitutional
force. In consequence, if the original model of constitutional democracy
at the center of Western societies relied on a balance between
democratic sovereignty and the establishment of rights as autonomous
institutes, the tendency towards the autonomous construction of rights
is now well advanced and apparently unstoppable. This appears to
corroborate the view that the constitutional fabric of modern society
differs paradigmatically from that cast by the rights revolutions that
instituted the original political form of modern Western society. This
also gives substance to the widening perception that the transnational
rights revolution and the growth of a transnational constitutional order
in contemporary society marks the end of the democratic constitutional
tradition initiated in the Enlightenment and cemented in the twentieth
century. 148 The prepotence of rights as dominant elements of the
transnational political order reflects and reinforces the increasing
autonomy of law, and it is a specific feature of societies marked by
decreasing powers of centralized agency and a weakly-centered demos.
Despite this, however, the perception of this emergent reality of
global constitutional governance as constituting a distinctively
problematic occurrence or as marking a deep transformation of the
original idea of constitutional democracy depends in certain respects on
a literal/normative, and sociologically under-reflected, account of
classical constitutional-democratic foundation. In particular, as
discussed, this view relies on the literalistic presumption that modern
states originally evolved around constitutionally organized reserves of
participatory will formation. This view identifies rights merely as
generalized normative limits on the unboundaried expressions of this
will. However, if the historicallfunctionalist approach to constitutional
148. DIETER GRIMM, DIE ZUKUJNFr DER VERFASSUNG 12 (1991).
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rule proposed above is utilized, constitutional democracy might be
observed, not in the first instance as a volitional construction, but
rather as a form of internal/abstractive inclusion for the increasingly
differentiated political and legal system of modern society. 149 As such,
constitutional democracy originally enabled legal/political institutions to
integrate the social exchanges of members of a differentiated society in
a reasonably even, positive, and internally reproducible fashion; to
render a society subject to uniform, internally stabilized, and simply
extensible normative expectation; and to establish the basic building
blocks for the use of political power as an abstract, flexible, and
positively circulated resource. 15 0 In this model, rights necessarily gave
impetus to the abstraction of political power, and throughout the
construction of the modern political system, rights have performed the
specific function of distilling both power and law into a form of intensely
iterable autonomy and inclusivity. They allow the law and politics of
society to internally adapt to, and assume complex cohesion in face of,
the complex and contingent pressures of differentiated political
inclusion that accompany the development of modern societal form. If
constitutional democracy is seen as a pattern of evenly abstracted legal
and political inclusion, rights and power are inextricably
interdependent: the capacity of rights for producing reserves of power
for modern society is the perennially defining feature of
constitutionalism. In contemporary society, rights preserve and in fact
intensify this primary function. It is a mistake to look for constituent
power as the dominant force in the generation of democratic power. In
both classical and contemporary constitutionalism, this function falls to
rights.
As a more general observation, analysis of the emergent form(s) of
the transnational constitution might benefit from more encompassing
sociological examination. A perspective founded in a
historical/functionalist approach might be able to offer an account of
this constitution that provides a causal framework for interpreting its
formation, proposes a generic sociological paradigm for approaching the
intensified abstraction of rights, and elucidates the position of this
constitution within a wider morphology of modern power. On this
approach, the new models of highly judicialized, rights-led democracy
implied in global governance regimes do not negate the original
149. See a similar account in Niklas Luhmann, Machtkreislauf und Recht in Demokratien,
2 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 164 (1981).
150. Note again the Luhmannian theoretical background to these claims. See generally
Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als Evolutionire Errungenschaft [Constitution as an
Evolutionary Accomplishment], 9 RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL [LEGAL-HISTORICAL
JOURNAL] 201 (1991) (Ger.).
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normative form of constitutional democracy. On the contrary, they,
transform, extend and perpetuate it. This rising pattern of global
governance constructs a system of extensible legal and political
inclusion in a societal reality in which the relatively controllable
processes of territorially circumscribed integration characterizing
earlier modern societies have become impossible, and where functions of
legal and political inclusion need to be performed at a very high level of
abstraction, internal contingency, and precarious variability. In this
reality, rights necessarily assume a high level of distinction against any
single or defined political will. In contemporary society, the capacity of
the legal/political system to incorporate a stable and identifiable demos
to support its inclusion is weak, and its reliance on the ability of rights
to generate highly abstracted and internalized principles of inclusion is
high: rights bring a support to law that enables it, in absence of external
or volitional centration, to project from within itself an abstracted
construction of its addressees, and, using this projection, to replicably
perpetuate and legitimize its operations. The increasing abstraction of
rights in contemporary society is thus a response to the rising demands
for highly contingent inclusion presently confronting legal and political
actors. Yet this also expresses an inclusionary dynamic defining all
constitutional/democratic systems, and it specifically accentuates earlier
sociological functions of constitutions in order to preserve a system of
flexible political inclusion adequate to contemporary society.
In contemporary, transnationally interconnected societies,
transnational rights have assumed the polity-building functions first
accorded (perhaps too literalistically) to sovereign/democratic agents,
and the functions of the demos in providing legitimacy for political
power have been displaced into the functions of rights. Societies now use
rights as an intensely dialectical model of inclusion, allowing their legal
and political systems to internalize a construction of their constituent
origins in order to preempt and to uniformly legitimize their political
functions in relation to highly varied and pluralistically situated objects
(persons) in societies shaped by weak reserves of agency. Against a
background of rising societal contingency and extreme unevenness and
uncertainty in the social terrains subject to legal/political inclusion,
rights have necessarily assumed a more far-reaching role in
pre-constructing the procedures and objects for legal inclusion. Rights
now fully define these procedures and objects, such that the volitional
element of democracy, weak in all democratic polities, is all but
eradicated. Rights cement inclusionary legal and political realities in
society by implanting in the law a movable and replicable image of its
constituent authors, which was always implied as, yet never factually
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became, the author of law's force.151 Rights are the law's reduced and
auto-constituent projection of its own constituent source, and, endlessly
re-entered into the law by the law, they constitute the form of law's
autonomy and inclusivity in its highly varied and unpredictable societal
settings. As such, rights insulate the law against the growing
contingency of its application. They project for law an internal
normative source, or quasi-constituent structure no longer provided by
any clear source of human agency, and they allow modern societies to
create consistent political structures across diffuse environments.
As mentioned, in transnational society, rights have finally defined a
code for the contemporary political system. That is, rights have the
function of allowing a society to register certain exchanges as requiring
legal inclusion, and, even in conditions of extreme polycentricity, they
allow the formation of collective regulatory structures. Indeed, they
enable societies to mark out certain exchanges and institutional
procedures and actors as still distinctively political. This may be seen as
anti-democratic. But it may also be seen as a sociological perpetuation of
the inner functions of constitutional democracy, whose original, albeit
functionally submerged, design also projected rights as the code of
society's politics. As mentioned, the global constitutional form set by the
transnational rights revolution is merely a rearticulated or intensified
expression of the national constitutional form. However, most observers
of transnational constitutions are prevented by their methodological
apparatus from identifying and comprehending this idea.
151. For a similar point, see David Jacobson & Galya Benarieh Ruffer, Courts Across
Borders: The Implications of Judicial Agency for Human Rights and Democracy, 25 HUM.
RTS. Q. 74, 83, 86, 90 (2003).
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